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PATHOLOGIZING PROFESSIONAL LIFE:
PSYCHO-LITERARY CASE STORIES
James R. Elkins*
I.
D.T. Jones, the divorce lawyer in Stephen Greenleaf's novel,
The Ditto List, finds himself in a law practice devoted to
run-of-the-mill divorce cases.' In an early scene in the novel,
Jones leaves the courtroom after being chastised by a judge for
putting the wrong divorce client on the stand. D.T., reflecting on
the embarrassment, says to himself: "Another day, another dollar,
another slap of shame."2 D.T.'s only "consolation" in the judge's
rebuke is "that no one except his ex-wife had ever called him
anything he had not already called himself."3 D.T. admits that
his life as a lawyer has not turned out the way he imagined it.
Had he known anyone to whom he could have been
truthful about such things, he would have confessed
during his freshman year [in law school] that he believed
himself a fermenting mix of Perry Mason and Clarence
Darrow, a nascent champion of lost causes, reviver of
trampled liberties, master of the sine qua non of the trial
lawyer's art-convincing anyone of anything. But after
he had gone into practice on his own-against the advice
of everyone he knew and a lot of those he didn't-the
clients who came his way all possessed totally prosaic
difficulties, dilemmas that, while they involved the basic
passions and requirements of life and therefore invoked
* Professor, West Virginia University School of Law; LL.M. 1975, Yale Law School;
J.D. 1971, B.A. 1967, University of Kentucky.
1. STEPHEN GREENLEAF, THE DirTO LIST (1985); see also BARRY REED, THE VERDICT
(Bantam Books 1983) (1980) (relating the story of another fictional lawyer whose legal
practice has ended up in a mess).
The price of [Frank] Galvin's digression was written everywhere ... the
cigarette lighter that wouldn't work; the windows that leaked and wheezed; the
paint blistering on the walls; the Oriental rug beginning to fray. Even Galvin's
custom-tailored suit was out of style, and the shirt cuffs would no longer stay
crisp.
REED, supra, at 6.
2. GREENLEAF, supra note 1, at 14.
3. Id. It is often the spouses of lawyers that remind them of the humanity that their
practice of law has helped them forget. See, e.g., GEORGE V. HIGGINS, KENNEDY FOR THE
DEFENSE (1980); LOuis AUCHINCLOSS, DIARY OF A YUPPIE (1986).
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D.T.'s empathy and an invariably unprofitable expendi-
ture of his time, did not attract the kind of publicity or
renown that would bring more glorious causes to his
door.
Mildly injurious dog bites, trivial slips and falls,
evictions, credit hassles, change of names-the clients
trooped in and out of his office like files of captured
soldiers, asking little, getting less. His silver tongue
tarnished by life's relentless ambiguity, the major Perry
Masonish mystery in his practice soon came to be wheth-
er he would be able to pay Confederated Properties the
exorbitant rent for the suite of offices that, he insisted as
a point of pride, be at least one storey above the street
and occupy at least one more room than the nearest
branch of Legal Aid. So, twenty years after his dreams
of glory and eminence had vanished as steadily as a salt
lick in a stockyard, here he was, not quite envious of
others, yet not quite satisfied with himself, pursuing a
profession whose moral component was detectable only
with the aid of a microscope or a philosopher.4
What are lawyers and teachers of law students to make of
D.T.'s confession that his life has turned out poorly?5 Do the
initiation rites of legal education promote phantasies of law and
its practice that set us up for dissatisfaction, disaffection, and
dis-ease? Do our phantasy images of professional glamor-rooted
in the image of the lawyer as hero-set us out on a mythic quest
or a fool's errand? How do we, in the reality of law practice, use
phantasy images of ourselves as lawyers to construct misleading
fictions, fictions that induce professional neurosis?6
Robert Service, Louis Auchincloss's lawyer protagonist in
another lawyer novel, Diary of a Yuppie, aspires to an elite
practice far different than D.T. Jones's off-the-street divorce
4. GREENLEAF, supra note 1, at 18.
5. One's first reaction might well be that D.T. simply suffers a fate common to all, an
inability to predict how our lives will turn out.
6. In becoming a lawyer, we dream, pray, and phantasize, even as we confront the
necessities we call reality. We contrive, in better and worse ways, to make lives out of the
phantasy images we take up, constrained as a life must be, by given (ready-made) stories.
Our stories help determine how we live illusive fiction and firm reality, and how each are
transmuted into the other.
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practice.7 Service has made himself a specialist in corporate
takeovers with the goal of becoming a partner in the prosperous
corporate law firm where he has been an associate for eight
years.' Service is thirty-two years old and extremely ambitious.9
Unlike D.T. Jones, Robert Service is single-mindedly devoted to
ambition. "Partnership," Service says, "has been my sole ambi-
tion-you might even call it my obsession-throughout eight
years"'0 of driving work, including most weekday nights and
many weekends. Service's ambition has made possible the kind
of success that has eluded D.T. Jones, but it is success at a
cost." Service, like so many lawyers, is not prone to introspec-
tion but he is still able to recognize that his obsession with
becoming a firm partner is problematic. On the eve of the firm's
announcement of his partnership he observes that he doesn't feel
the "anticipated ecstasy." 2 Instead, there is a "quickening
anxiety" over whether he has chosen the right firm. Service
easily rationalizes the anxiety by reminding himself that he has
"rarely enjoy[ed] even a brief elation" after he has accomplished
a goal.' 4
Alice, Service's wife, has a starker assessment of the cost of
her husband's ambition. She asks him at one point, "Oh, Robert,
Robert, can't you see what's happening to you?"' 5 And her
husband's response: "I'm tired of your illusions, Alice! You think
you're like Scrooge's girl friend in A Christmas Carol, who gives
him up because she feels his heart is turning to gold. So noble,
7. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 3, at 9.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Legal work is a breeding ground for obsession. Yet, some of our obsessions as
lawyers are associated with the virtue of professional life: the possibility of doing socially
meaningful work, work that directly and dramatically influences the lives of those who
retain our services, work that demands extensive knowledge and performative skills, work
that requires skills to avoid harmful consequences.
11. See DOUGLAS LABIER, MODERN MADNESS: THE EMOTIONAL FALLOUT OF SUCCESS
(1986) (exploring the "cost" of success).
12. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 3, at 12.
13. Id.
14. Id. Choosing the right firm can make a difference in how a young lawyer's
phantasies are shaped or distorted as they are worked out in the local reality of law firm
practice. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM (1991) (providing a dramatic novelistic treatment
where this process of shaping and distortion are an essential part of the narrative plot).
15. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 3, at 107.
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so sad, so firm. But what horse manure it all is!" 16 D.T. Jones
notes the difficulty in locating what he called the "moral compo-
nent" in his law work. Robert Service and his wife, Alice, have
different views on the "moral component" of his corporate law
work. Service says of their difference:
What I had to despair of ever making Alice see was
that I was not immoral. I simply accepted the basic
greed and selfishness of human beings. I recognized that
they are always going to act in their own interests and
that they should be allowed to do so except where an
actual crime to person or property was threatened....
A man could go right up to the threshold of crime, but
not a step farther. Not even a half step! Alice, for the
life of her, couldn't see this as a moral code. But to me
it is the only valid one. The rest is cant.1
7
Service finds his realist stance preferable, and morally superior,
to Alice's moralist perspective.' 8 Lawyers, when they practice
outside the narrow confines of speciality and corporate practices,
do indeed get a sobering view of the world. It may be sobering
enough to convince them that the only thing that will save any of
us is the crude justice that law makes possible. The problem with
Robert Service's realism is that it shuts him off from what his
wife, Alice, is trying to tell him. A lawyer's version of realism can
make you deaf to what others offer about the moral perspectives
we begin to take for granted.'9
16. Id. at 108.
17. Id. One suspects that Service's moral proclamation, similar in some ways to that
of Sir Thomas More, when put to ruthless practice doing corporate takeovers, has taken
a dramatically different turn than it did in the life of More. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR
ALL SEASONS (First Vintage International 1990) (1962).
18. Robert explains his realism this way:
I could never see that there was any real substance to the idols that my elders
respected or purported to respect. They were not only hollow, but you could
see they were hollow, or if you had any doubt about it, you had only to give one
of them a tap.
AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 3, at 109. Service's assessment of the moral fiber of the "elders"
may be accurate enough to support his argument, but it cannot, ultimately, provide the
moral basis for his own practices.
19. An overdetermined realism can undermine even the most purposeful life. Charles
Reich, whose story will be taken up later in this article, see infra part III, says "I took
pride in being as realistic as possible, but to a large extent I ended up misdirecting my
energy, being concerned with the wrong things, spending years attempting to master the
[Vol. 18:581584
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Auchincloss plays Service's moral stance as a lawyer against
not only the concerns expressed by his wife, Alice, but of Blanders
Blakelock, one of the grand old men of the firm, an aging
idealist.2 ° In one of the best scenes in the novel,21 Service and
Blakelock argue over whether to use the "dirt" Service has
uncovered in the firm's representation of a client engaged in a
hostile takeover of a competitor.2 2  Blakelock, when he hears
wrong curriculum." CHARLES REICH, THE SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 21 (1976).
20. Auchincloss creates a more complex character in senior partner Blanders Blakelock
than he does in the young, ruthless, Robert Service. Consider, for example, the scene
where Blakelock lectures Service on how to argue a motion in federal court. Blakelock has,
says Service, "great confidence in himself as a coach and likes to imagine himself as an
impresario, a kind of Svengali who can inspire or even hypnotize a disciple into a brilliant
performance." AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 3, at 11. In a speech to Service about Judge
Axeman, the federal judge hearing a pretrial motion in a case on which Service and
Blakelock are working together, Blakelock says:
Remember, also, Robert, that Judge Axeman, like so many of our federal
bench, thinks of himself as a man who can change the world. While the
president and Congress are paralyzed by party faction, he will ensure that
discrimination shall be abolished, if he has to bus our youth a million miles a
day; that votes shall be equal, if he has to redistrict all our states; and that the
environment shall be preserved, if he must bring industry to a grinding halt!
God bless him-I'm half on his side. But what, you will ask, can a reforming
judge expect to accomplish in a corporate takeover? Is it not a case of two
scorpions in a bottle? Perhaps. But remember that behind every judicial
idealist there lurks a lover of power. Axeman likes to play with our big
companies as a boy with an electric train. And that is where your role comes
in. You must make him feel that the takeover of Shaughnessy Products is a
more efficient way of distributing the loaves and fishes to the multitude! You
must help him to don the toga of the public servant. Precedent must bow to
the general welfare-that is, when precedent is against us!
Id. at 14-15. Blakelock's idealism is tainted either by hypocrisy or a deep-lying streak of
cynicism.
21. Diary ofa Yuppie is by no means Auchincloss's best work of lawyer fiction, indeed,
it turns out to be an exceptionally poor one. Auchincloss has given us a far better lawyer
novel in LOUIS AUCHINCLOSS, THE GREAT WORLD AND TIMOTHY COLT (McGraw-Hill
Paperback 1987) (1956).
22. Service has discovered that the CEO of the target firm has kept his alcoholic
brother on the corporate payroll and covered up the brother's embezzlement. Service
wants to use this information to initiate a stockholders' suit to seek the removal of the
CEO who is strongly resisting the takeover bid. (Strongly resisting means that the CEO
is using the "scorched earth" policy of encumbering his firm with debts and long-term
leases to discourage the take-over bid.) Blakelock resists using the evidence in the
takeover bid because he knows the CEO of the target firm and admires his efforts to
support his brother.
Al has always looked after the poor nut.
... He's supported that brother all his life and put his son and daughter
through college. He even manufactured a kind of career for him in
Shaughnessy, at his own considerable expense. I never heard of anyone who
Vermont Law Review
what Service wants to do, expresses outrage. He argues that it's
"obscene" to use the kind of tactics his young associate wants to
use.2" Blakelock says to Service: "Robert, you appall me. You
would really, for a dubious advantage to a client, so bespatter
your adversary?"24 After Blakelock decides against the use of
the derogatory information, Service tries to convince him to hold
off a few days before making a final decision. Weary of the
argument, Blakelock tells Service: "Go home, Robert! Go home
before I lose my temper! Take the weekend off; stay away from
the office. Tell your darling wife what you have told me and
listen carefully to what she says. I miss my guess if she will not
agree with me."25 With Blakelock and Alice, readers of the novel
may begin to have doubts about Robert Service's character.26
Doubts stem less from what Service proposes to do, more from the
way he responds to Blakelock when his tactics are questioned.
We begin to see that Service's ambition and drive to succeed have
resulted in a ruthlessness that cuts him off from the sound advice
of colleagues and his wife. Alice and Blakelock, neither without
problems or moral defects, have at least maintained a capacity to
see that success is not an assurance of the good life."
Fictional accounts of lawyers like D.T. Jones and Robert
Service suggest that one's life as a lawyer may not turn out as
expected, and when it does, it may have been at a cost that others
see better than we do. Jones and Service entered the legal
profession with different ideas about becoming successful and
did more for a sibling.
AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 3, at 16.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. at 19-20.
26. There is, so far as I know, no way to question another's judgment without having
that judgment and the character of one who makes it, in turn, subject to judgment. Since
it is Blakelock and Alice who raise doubts about Service's character, we must, in turn,
examine their character. See generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien trans.,
1956); see also infra part V (discussing The Fall).
27. For many years now I have raised this question about what constitutes the good
life-in the Socratic sense of good-with those who set out to be lawyers. I can assure you
there are quarrels aplenty, not only about responses to the question, but whether the
question should even be raised. Indeed, it seems that to simply pose the question makes
people uncomfortable.
One might speculate about the effect of turning the question around. If, for whatever
reason, we are reduced to interminable quarrels about how to pursue a worthwhile life, are
we more pragmatically equipped to explore the corollary question: What happens when the
life we live goes astray?
586 [Vol. 18:581
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living the good life. But both, in their own way, have failed. D.T.
Jones has a stronger sense than does Service of the gap between
what he imagined his life as a lawyer would be and how it has
turned out. Nevertheless, when his wife Alice leaves him, even
Robert Service is forced to do some reflective thinking.
Something can and often does go wrong in the way we
lawyers live our lives. Built-in, it seems, to a lawyer's dream of
success is the infliction of wounds.2" Getting the hang of
professional life, and hanging with it in ways that do not psycho-
logically, intellectually, morally,29 and spiritually consume us,
may not be all that easy. Consequently, some of us become
captives of stories we do not want to live. D.T. Jones and Robert
Service suggest that the life we pursue as lawyers can turn on us
and become pathological.
II.
Ivan Ilych is "an intelligent, polished, lively and agreeable
man," a lawyer in his mid-forties, dying of an unknown cause.3"
Ilych, his death near, realizes that his life has gone astray,
become unreal, fraudulent. The problem, simply put, as Ilych
begins to understand it, is that his life has been a mistake. One
commentator notes that "[i]n the loneliness of his pain Ilych
understands at last that his life had been trivial and disgust-
ing."3" Tolstoy's fictional lawyer, Ivan Ilych, provides an
elaborated case story of a lawyer who sets out with high hopes,
follows the well-worn path of success, and is up-ended by bitter
disappointment and failure.
Tolstoy's evocative story allows us to follow the evolution of
Ilych's mistaken life, a life of immediate interest because he is a
lawyer, a success, and a man who carefully adapts himself to
28. The nature of these wounds may be different for men and women. See MICHAEL
MEADE, MEN AND THE WATER OF LIFE: INITIATION AND THE TEMPERING OF MEN (1993)
(discussing the wounds that men incur in our culture).
29. D.T. Jones's assessment of the minuscule nature of the "moral component" in his
work is a point of contention in the life and professional practice of Robert Service. The
lawyer fiction genre helps us see that lawyers are knee-deep in moral philosophy, even
when, like Robert Service, we want to deny it.
30. LEO TOLSTOY, The Death of Ivan Ilych, in THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER
STORIES 95, 105 (Aylmer Maude trans., 1960).
31. PHILIP RAHV, The Death of Ivan Ilyich and Joseph K, in IMAGE & IDEA 111, 118
(Greenwood Press 1978) (1949).
1994] 587
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professional life. While no fictional lawyer is going to provide the
perfect mirror in which we can see ourselves fully,32 Ilych is not
easily dismissed, unless one takes the position that all fictional
lawyers are by their fictional nature remote from the lives we live.
Ilych, as so many of us, follows a rather well-worn path.33 Like
Robert Service, Ilych has a strong sense of his own rectitude,
pursues his legal career with dedication, and does not let his
personal and family life interfere with his law work.
Tolstoy begins Ilych's story with his days as a law student
when Ilych was "capable, cheerful, good-natured, and [a] sociable
man, though strict in the fulfillment of what he considered to be
his duty . . . .3 Upon completion of his law studies, Ilych
dresses himself with the help of a "fashionable tailor" and
appoints himself in the fashions of a gentleman, "all purchased at
the best shops."3' He finds his first position with the help and
influence of his father. In his work Ilych "arranged as easy and
agreeable a position for himself as he had had at the School of
Law. He performed his official tasks, made his career, and at the
same time amused himself pleasantly and decorously."3  He
"performed the duties entrusted to him.., with an exactness and
incorruptible honesty of which he could not but feel proud."37
There were, it is true, indiscretions, an affair, "visits to a certain
outlying street of doubtful reputation; and.., some obsequious-
ness to his chief and even to his chief's wife, but all this was done
with such a tone of good breeding that no hard names could be
applied to it."
38
In his first position, as in each that followed, Ilych succeeded.
In becoming an examining magistrate, Ilych remained a "deco-
32. Literature does not, even in its ability to reflect our lives, give us the power of a
personal x-ray machine.
33. By well-worn path, I mean that Ilych's life is commonplace. He adopts and accepts
narrowly circumscribed roles in his career, marriage, and friendships. For example, one
commentator has noted that "throughout his professional life [Ilych] had assumed the
lawyer's functionary pose to his clients." RONALD V. SAMPSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER
129 (Vintage Books 1968) (1965). Sampson notes that as "a commonplace man" Ilych "puts
his petty pleasures and ambitions before the question of the meaning of his life." Id. at
138. To follow the well-worn path then, in Sampson's view, is to let our "petty pleasures"
consume us.
34. TOLSTOY, supra note 30, at 105.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 106.
37. Id.
38. Id.
588 [Vol. 18:581
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rous" man, "inspiring general respect and capable of separating
his official duties from his private life."39 Ilych was a good
lawyer in the sense that he had a method of eliminating all
considerations irrelevant to the legal aspect of the case, and
reducing even the most complicated case to a form in which it
would be presented on paper only in its externals, completely
excluding his personal opinion of the matter, while above all
observing every prescribed formality.40 Ilych knew how to keep
his eye on the ball. Sculpting unwieldy human problems into
legal shape is what lawyers get paid to do. Ilych used his
self-limiting vision both to make life more comfortable and to
insure his success.4'
The harshness of Ilych's narrow legalistic perspective was, we
are told, moderated by the fact that he "never abused his power,"
and we are told it was considerable, "he tried on the contrary to
soften its expression, but the consciousness of it and of the
possibility of softening its effect, supplied the chief interest and
attraction of his office."42 In his position as magistrate, Ilych
made connections, and took up "an attitude of rather dignified
aloofness towards the provincial authorities."43 In his circle of
wealthy and legal friends he "assumed a tone of slight dissatisfac-
tion with the government, of moderate liberalism, and of enlight-
ened citizenship."44 He grew a beard and learned to play bridge.
Ilych is one of the boys, an insider, a pro, an established profes-
sional, a success. He has, in contemporary parlance, made it.
Ilych meets and marries Praskovya Fedorovna Mikhel. She
becomes pregnant and jealous. Ilych tries to ignore his wife's
moods and-enjoy life as he had before marriage but he finds it
increasingly difficult. Ilych deals with the discord he attributes
to Praskovya by spending more time at the office. "As his wife
grew more irritable and exacting and Ivan Ilych transferred the
centre of gravity of his life more and more to his official work, so
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id. at 107-08.
41. Seymour Wishman, in his autobiography of lawyering, describes a similar
narrowing of vision. See SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER
(Penguin Books 1982) (1981); see also James R. Elkins, The Moral Labyrinth of Zealous
Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 735, 764-68 (1992) (discussing the moral implications of
Seymour Wishman's intentionally narrow vision).
42. TOLSTOY, supra note 30, at 107.
43. Id. at 108.
44. Id.
1994] 589
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did he grow to like his work better and became more ambitious
than before."45 Marriage and family life became a useful facade.
"He only required of [married life] those conveniences-dinner at
home, housewife, and bed-which it could give him, and above all
that propriety of external forms required by public opinion.""
Whenever things went badly with Praskovya "he at once retired
into his separate fenced-off world of official duties, where he found
satisfaction."47
There are more children, and further deterioration of the
marriage, to which Ilych is "impervious."48 After seven years as
magistrate, Ilych becomes a Public Prosecutor, a position that
allows him to demonstrate his competence and to exercise more
power. The new position "gave him pleasure and filled his life,
together with chats with his colleagues, dinners, and bridge. So
that on the whole Ivan Ilych's life continued to flow as he
considered it should do-pleasantly and properly."49  The
disputes with Praskovya continue, punctuated with "rare periods
of amorousness," however short in duration.50
Over time Ilych becomes more and more aloof, an aloofness
he accepts as normal.
His aim was to free himself more and more from those
unpleasantnesses and to give them a semblance of
harmlessness and propriety. He attained this by spend-
ing less and less time with his family, and when obliged
to be at home he tried to safeguard his position by the
presence of outsiders.... The whole interest of his life
now centred in the official world and that interest
absorbed him.51
Ilych is passed over for a judgeship and takes it badly. The
result is that he "experienced ennui for the first time in his life,
45. Id. at 110.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 110-11.
48. Id. at 111.
49. Id. at 112.
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id.
590 [Vol. 18:581
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and not only ennui but intolerable depression." 2 The depression
lifts when he secures a long coveted higher salary and rank. As
a result Ilych is "more cheerful and contented than he had been
for a long time."5 3 The change suited Preskovya and the future
looked bright.
Ilych evolves different identities for his personal and profes-
sional lives.
In official matters, despite his youth and taste for
frivolous gaiety, he was exceedingly reserved, punctilious,
and even severe; but in society he was often amusing and
witty, and always good-natured, correct in his manner,
and bon enfant, as the governor and his wife-with whom
he was like one of the family-used to say of him.54
"The pleasures connected with his work were pleasures of
ambition; his social pleasures were those of vanity. . .. ""
Following the pattern established in his earlier official
positions Ilych, in the new position at the justice ministry,
attempts:
to exclude everything fresh and vital, which always
disturbs the regular course of official business, and to
admit only official relations with people, and then only on
official grounds. A man would come, for instance,
wanting some information. Ivan Ilych, as one in whose
sphere the matter did not lie, would have nothing to do
with him: but if the man had some business with him in
his official capacity, something that could be expressed on
officially stamped paper, he would do everything, posi-
tively everything he could within limits of such relations,
and in doing so would maintain the semblance of friendly
human relations, that is, would observe the courtesies of
life. As soon as the official relations ended, so did
everything else. Ivan Ilych possessed this capacity to
52. Id. at 113. Depression is on the increase and takes its biggest toll on the lives of
those who are ambitious. See, e.g., Brian O'Reilly, Depression and How to Beat It,
FORTUNE, Nov. 29, 1993, at 70.
53. TOLSTOY, supra note 30, at 114.
54. Id. at 106.
55. Id. at 119.
1994]
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separate his real life from the official side of affairs and
not mix the two, in the highest degree, and by long
practice and natural aptitude had brought it to such a
pitch that sometimes, in the manner of a virtuoso, he
would even allow himself to let the human and official
relations mingle. He let himself do this just because he
felt that he could at any time he chose resume the
strictly official attitude again and drop the human
relation. And he did it all easily, pleasantly, correctly,
and even artistically.56
Simply put, Ilych makes an art of official aloofness, of compart-
mentalizing his personal and professional life. The compartment-
alization allows him to do what his official duties require and
ignore everything else.
There are also disappointments and set-backs. Ilych, working
on a ladder one day in his study, falls, but is unable to locate any
visible injury. Later, the family has a dance, and there is a
quarrel with Praskovya about forty-five rubles she has spent on
the confectioner's bill. "It was a great and disagreeable quarrel.
Praskovya Fedorovna called him 'a fool and an imbecile,' and he
clutched at his head and made angry allusions to divorce."57 But
the quarrel quieted. In fact, "life flowed pleasantly .... They
were all in good health. It could not be called ill health if Ivan
Ilych sometimes said that he had a queer taste in his mouth and
felt some discomfort in his left side."8
The fall, insignificant at the time, becomes associated with a
persistent, irritable pain. When Ilych finally visits a doctor he
has the misfortune of seeking the services of a physician who
mirrors his own approach to professional life. To Ilych the
question is: Is this illness serious or not? But to the physician
"the real question was to decide between a floating kidney,
chronic catarrh, or appendicitis." 59  The physician does not
understand Ilych, or make any effort to do so.
The pain grows worse and "the taste in his mouth grew
stranger and stranger.60 Ilych describes the taste as loathsome.
56. Id. at 117-18.
57. Id. at 118-19.
58. Id. at 119-20.
59. Id. at 121.
60. Id. at 125.
592 [Vol. 18:581
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"There was no deceiving himself: something terrible, new, and
more important than anything before in his life, was taking place
within him of which he alone was aware."61
After an evening of bridge, and good bridge at that, but with
the ever present "gnawing pain," 2 he overbids a hand and
becomes upset at his friends. "They had supper and went away,
and Ivan Ilych was left alone with the consciousness that his life
was poisoned and was poisoning the lives of others, and that this
poison did not weaken but penetrated more and more deeply into
his whole being. "63 Ilych begins to feel that he is living "all
alone on the brink of an abyss, with no one who understood or
pitied him."6
One evening, a brother-in-law visits and Ilych observes a
glance, a look, that confirms that he is indeed sick. He retires to
his room to read and reflect on his pain, and in doing so he
stumbles into a new insight: "It's not a question of appendix or
kidney, but of life and.., death. Yes, life was there and now it
is going, going and I cannot stop it."65 "'There was light and
now there is darkness. I was here and now I'm going there!
Where?' A chill came over him, his breathing ceased, and he felt
only the throbbing of his heart."6
Ilych is overtaken now by the realization that he is dying and
that he is afraid: "When I am not, what will there be? There will
be nothing. Then where shall I be when I am no more? Can this
be dying? No, I don't want to!67 "It cannot be that I ought to
die."6" "How is one to understand it?"69
Ilych struggles against these intruding thoughts of death; he
attempts to subdue them and recover the happiness he had so
taken for granted. He returns to the law courts and:
enter[s] into conversation with his colleagues, and sit[s]
carelessly as was his wont, scanning the crowd with a
61. Id.
62. Id. at 126.
63. Id. at 126-27.
64. Id. at 127.
65. Id. at 129.
66. Id. at 130.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 132.
69. Id.
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thoughtful look and leaning both his emaciated arms on
the arms of his oak chair; bending over as usual to a
colleague and drawing his papers nearer he would
interchange whispers with him, and then suddenly
raising his eyes and sitting erect would pronounce certain
words and open the proceedings. But suddenly in the
midst of those proceedings the pain in his side, regardless
of the stage the proceedings had reached, would begin its
own gnawing work. Ivan Ilych would turn his attention
to it and try to drive the thought of it away, but without
success. It would come and stand before him and look at
him, and he would be petrified and the light would die
out of his eyes, and he would again begin asking himself
whether It'alone was true. And his colleagues and
subordinates would see with surprise and distress that
he, the brilliant and subtle judge, was becoming confused
and making mistakes. He would shake himself, try to
pull himself together, manage somehow to bring the
sitting to a close, and return home with the sorrowful
consciousness that his judicial labours could not as
formerly hide from him what he wanted them to hide,
and could not deliver him from It. And what was worst
of all was that It drew his attention to itself not in order
to make him take some action but only that he should
look at It, look it straight in the face: look at it and
without doing anything, suffer inexpressibly.
.... [Niothing could be done with It except to look at
it and shudder.7"
Ilych, fighting the thought of death, is troubled by the stance
of his friends and colleagues who act as if there were nothing
wrong with him. There was "falsity around him and within
him,"7 a falsity that seemed to poison his relations with every-
one in his life.v2 Neither Ilych nor his wife had the ability to
70. Id. at 132-34.
71. Id. at 138.
72. Ronald Sampson interprets the falsity that surrounds Ilych's life as central to the
psychological and moral teaching of the story. Sampson puts it this way:
The way in which human beings customarily deal with facts that are painful
or otherwise unacceptable is to deny them or, if this is not possible, to ignore
them. The painful fact to be assimilated and managed in this instance is the
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respond to each other or themselves outside the roles they had
adopted for themselves and each other. No one in Ilych's life was
able to talk with him about what was happening. In the course
of all this, "[h]e saw that no one felt for him."73 Suffering from
loneliness and despair Ilych, perhaps for the first time in his life,
finds a need for truth.
As Ilych becomes consumed by thoughts of death, he begins
to question how his life has gone astray. There was a time, Ilych
remembers, before the suffering, when he enjoyed life. Of that
time, he remembers his days as a law student, and realizes that
the real pleasures of those early times have been lost. Ilych says,
It is as if I had been going downhill while I imagined I
was going up. And that is really what it was. I was
going up in public opinion, but to the same extent life
was ebbing away from me. And now it is all done and
there is only death.74
Later, Ilych finds his life best explained by an image: "a stone
falling downwards with increasing velocity." 75
Ilych finally comes around to ask of himself, "What if my
whole life has really been wrong?""6
It occurred to him that his scarcely perceptible at-
forthcoming decease of Ivan Ilych, a fact on no account to be admitted or
alluded to. Thus does Ivan Ilych find himself enshrouded in a world of
protective falsehood and pretence. Everybody knows he is going to die; he
knows he is going to die; they know he knows he is going to die; but the polite
fiction must be maintained to the last that he is temporarily sick and in
process of being cured. It is this enveloping, stifling aura of unreality and
deception that tortures Ivan Ilych more than all else.
SAMPSON, supra note 33, at 128.
Sampson links Ilych's deception to the roles that Ilych and those around him have
adopted:
As he throughout his professional life had assumed the lawyer's functionary
pose to his clients, so now the doctor assumes his "doctor-patient" relationship,
and his wife the understanding, tolerantly affectionate marital role. All alike
share in the falsity that accompanies the etiquette of middle-class relations.
Id. at 129.
73. TOLSTOY, supra note 30, at 138. There is one relationship in which he could take
comfort, the one with his servant Gerasim, who seems to pity him. "Gerasim alone did not
lie." Id.
74. Id. at 148.
75. Id. at 150.
76. Id. at 152.
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tempts to struggle against what was considered good by
the most highly placed people, those scarcely noticeable
impulses which he had immediately suppressed, might
have been the real thing, and all the rest false. And his
professional duties and the whole arrangement of his life
and of his family, and all his social and official interests,
might all have been false. He tried to defend all those
things to himself and suddenly felt the weakness of what
he was defending. There was nothing to defend."
"'Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done,' it suddenly occurs
to him. 'But how could that be, when I did everything proper-
ly?"'78
III.
Charles Reich's autobiographical account of his years as a
Washington lawyer, like Tolstoy's fictional account of Ivan Ilych,
presents a man's bafflement at how one can reach the pinnacle of
success and still be a failure.79 Reich most certainly did not
envision failure when he gained admission to the corridors of legal
power in Washington, D.C. There was a clerkship with a
Supreme Court Justice, work in a major Washington, D.C. law
firm, a professorship on the faculty of Yale Law School, and
acclaim as a legal scholar. But no success is great enough to
shield Reich from the realization that his life has been based on
the "wrong curriculum."' "My plan [for education, lawyering,
happiness, life] was logical, but every year that I followed it, I
found that the things I really wanted were yet further away.""1
Reich's observations on his disaffection might be of interest to
other young lawyers, to those who think they know what they
want with a life in law and find, as they become insiders, that
something is wrong with the life they imagined. "We sat at desks
piled high with work, confident enough that we were going to
bring home a great heap of happiness one day. What we did not
tell one another was the fact that we had not found what we
77. Id.
78. Id. at 148.
79. REICH, supra note 19.
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 22.
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wanted." 2
It was, says Reich, "logical" to set out on the course that he
followed. 3 The logic consists of a prescription, or script, on how
to get ahead and be successful. 84 The script even warns that
sacrifice will be necessary. "At the time," he says, "it did not
seem strange to me that the path lead away from
happiness-toward hard, intense, unrewarding work or toward
spending my life in situations that did not feel good."' The
unrewarding nature of law school and law practice work is
interpreted as the sacrifice that makes future rewards possible.
The more legal work becomes devoid of intrinsic meaning the
more we are likely to project our rewards into an expected future
of contended happiness.
For Reich, as for Ivan Ilych and Robert Service, the sacrifice
seems reasonable enough; the rewards, at least initially, are
ample. But the logic and the life gives way as Ilych falls into
despair; it gives way for Reich when he diagnoses himself as an
unlovable, unloving person.s6 Coming back to his apartment one
night, Reich says: "In the floor-length mirror in the lobby, I
caught an image of myself. A young lawyer in a Brooks Brothers
suit, shined shoes, and a short haircut. A young man already old,
already encased in that suit: stiff, taut, inflexible, frowning
82. Id.
83. Id. at 20, 22.
84. ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: A NEW LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL
MEMORY 7 (1990).
A script is a set of expectations about what will happen next in a
well-understood situation. In a sense, many situations in life have the people
who participate in them seemingly reading their roles in a kind of play ....
Life experience means quite often knowing how to act and how others will act
in given stereotypical situations. That knowledge is called a script.
Id. Roger Schank, in my view, is a successor, in his exploration of scripts, to the father of
scripts, Eric Berne. See, e.g., ERIC BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY (1964); ERIC BERNE, WHAT
Do You SAY AFTER YOU SAY HELLO? (1972); ROGER C. SCHANK, THE CONNOISSEUR'S GUIDE
TO THE MIND: How WE THINK, How WE LEARN & WHAT IT MEANS TO BE INTELLIGENT
(1991) (providing a readable, intriguing account of the new script work).
85. REICH, supra note 19, at 21.
86. Reich's autobiography is not only a commentary on his years as a Washington, D.C.
lawyer, but also of his evolving sexual identity. The author will not attempt, in this
article, to speculate on the important and significant connections of Reich's sexual identity
to the pathologies he locates in his role as a lawyer. See James B. Stewart, Death of a
Partner, NEW YORKER, June 21, 1993, at 54 (providing an account of one Wall Street law
firm's efforts to keep the sexual identity of its partners walled-off from the life of the firm).
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-unlovable and unloving." 7
Reich's diagnosis requires him to confront the fact that he has
faithfully followed the well-worn path and that it has not worked.
I accepted the doctrine that happiness was a reward for
doing one's duty. I believed that if I did well at what
society wanted me to do, I would receive happiness
because society made good on its promises. I thought
that A's in school and weekend work at the office would
place me in a position to have the things I really wanted
in life ....8
To follow the socially prescribed path requires certain assump-
tions about life. 9 You expect things to work out. But Reich, like
Ivan Ilych, finds with dismay, that he has been betrayed, or
perhaps, has betrayed himself. We are, Reich points out, given
every reason to believe, by those around us, and by society, that
when we stay on The Path it will lead to happiness. Reich and
Ilych learn that the assumed guarantees were empty promises.
For Reich, it all begins innocently enough, he simply wanted to
participate in public life, to "see firsthand how our society was
run," to be a decision-maker, a man of the public. 90 For Reich,
coming of age in the years following World War II, the "real
world" was the world of public affairs.9' In this real world of
public life, Reich imagined a life of independence and competence.
In being a lawyer he would be able to look after himself and cope
with life. "I wanted," he says, "to be a strong and independent
man. I dreamed of being a leader."92  I assume that Reich's
87. REICH, supra note 19, at 94-95. Reich has caught what Seymour Wishman, the
criminal lawyer, describes as a "chilling glimpse" of himself. WISHMAN, supra note 41, at
16.
88. REICH, supra note 19, at 21-22.
89. Pay the dues and reap the rewards. No pain, no glory. Buckle down, buck up, and
get on with it. Take the good with the bad. With these lumpy bits of advice, we keep our
eyes on The Path, do what we are told (most of the time) (saving rebellion for the curse of
tormentors, after hours).
90. REICH, supra note 19, at 20.
91. Id. at 20. Compare RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION
OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (Bantam 1983) (1982) (providing a poignant account of education
that entails the learning of a new language, initiation into the American middle-class, and
gaining an identity as a public man) with RUBEN NAVARRETTE, JR., A DARKER SHADE OF
CRIMSON: ODYSSEY OF A HARVARD CHICANO (1993).
92. REICH, supra note 19, at 72.
598 [Vol. 18:581
Pathologizing Professional Life
thinking about law and the possibilities it offers for placing us at
the center of public life, at a place where important decisions get
made, is shared by many who find themselves drawn to law work.
But Reich's logic has a dangerous undercurrent. Reich seeks
a place in public life not only so he can be at the center of things
but to ward off fears and the sense of weakness and vulnerability
he experiences in his private life.93 Reich sees in lawyering what
many of us see: lawyers are secure, calm, competent, and realistic;
qualities Reich associates with adult life. In becoming a lawyer
Reich assumes he can heal the split he experiences between the
adult competence he desires and the world of childhood anxieties
and fears he carries around with him as a dark shadow in his
professional life.94 By becoming a lawyer he seeks to "cure"
himself.95 Reich assumes, it now turns out, erroneously, that his
education as a lawyer will make him whole.
Rather than heal the split between inner and outer self,
Reich's life as a lawyer accentuates the split. To manage his
inner and outer selves Reich leads a double life. Charlie is the
"young lawyer" in an influential Washington, D.C. law firm.'
Charlie's quest for a sense of competence as a lawyer squares
perfectly with a city whose "overriding value . . . was compe-
tence."97 At the same time Charlie pursues a life of competence,
Charles, the other self, carries the complex secret life of his
repressed homosexuality, and the ever present "dark fears,
inadequacies, and compulsions" which made him feel like "an
immature, sick person."98
The world that Charlie, the "young lawyer," inhabits is a
powerful and alluring one. In the Law Firm World, Charlie is a
"confident, busy young man."99 The lawyer work makes him feel
93. Reich believes that becoming a lawyer will make him independent of his family
who he fears is the source of his problems. Reich mentions in passing that he was looking
for a father when he became a law clerk to Justice Hugo Black and lived with him as if he
were a son. Id. at 22-23. The shaping of our adult lives by early family relations is a
central feature in the Richard Rodriguez autobiography. See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 91.
94. Reich's autobiography reveals an interior world that many readers will find easy
to disavow. The problem with disavowing the possibility that another's shadow (in this
case the dark side of the inner world) has meaning in our own lives is that we disavow our
own, differently configured, shadow.
95. REICH, supra note 19, at 20.
96. Id. at 20, 41-43.
97. Id. at 70.
98. Id. at 20-21; see also id. at 92-93.
99. Id. at 63.
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powerful and competent."° There are good people to work with
in this Law Firm World. "They were politically liberal, intelli-
gent, sophisticated, lively, entertaining, and excellent lawyers.
They were dedicated craftsmen, devoted to their profession." 10'
There is much to celebrate in the comforts and privileges of
law practiced in our nation's capitol:
The firm was an elegant place. I got a spirited
greeting from the receptionist when I arrived; then I sat
back in my swivel chair, feeling that I was able to cope
with the world. It was in many ways a highly privileged
existence. Lawyers arrived at work well after the
early-morning rush. I would get myself some coffee from
the large percolator down the hall and then enjoy the
luxury of settling back with The New York Times and the
Post-even reading the comics."0 2
Comfort and personal enjoyment are central to this Law Firm
World, a world where one learns to live with privilege and assume
a righteous sense of self-importance. Lawyers do important work,
in important buildings, with important people.
Consider a conference with a high government official
... I strode purposefully from the office, turning
around at the door to say impressively, "We'll be at the
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id. Craftsmanship in the corporate law firm leads to a product, the solving of a
problem specific to a client's needs while ignoring the needs of those who work on the
problem. See CARLA NEEDLEMAN, THE WORK OF CRAFT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF
CRAFTS AND CRAFTSMANSHIP (Kodansha America, Inc. 1993) (1979) (discussing the relation
of person and craft); see also WISHMAN, supra note 41 (providing another account of the
dark shadow side of the transmutation of craft ideals in law).
One way we defend ourselves against the pathologies of the Law Firm World is to focus
on the craft qualities of the work. Imagining the work as craft offers a way of centering
ourselves, a way of regarding/imagining work that confirms that what we do is associated
with Quality. Reich, for example, finds moments of real enjoyment in legal work. He
values the craftsmanship of his colleagues and the power that comes from being associated
with a craft like law.
The commitment to the craft features of law work can be subverted. Reich observes
how his colleagues "fell back on craftsmanship as a justification for their work" so that it
became "virtuosity for its own sake, a job that other professionals could appreciate."
REICH, supra note 19, at 36. Reich argues that the way to avoid impoverishment of law
as craft is to make the work "morally and socially responsible" and to insure that the craft
is a means of "self-expression." Id.
102. REICH, supra note 19, at 25-26.
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Department of Justice." We hailed a taxi and got in.
Then there was the monumental facade of the building
on Constitution Avenue. The marble hallways, the
elaborate reception room, the office of the official, an
American flag behind his desk, a view of the Capitol
Building from the long windows, portraits of predecessors
in office.... "
In the Law Firm World one strides purposefully and speaks
authoritatively, holding oneself out to others as a person of
privilege and power. This is a world in which power and privilege
are common; they are the pay-off for placing oneself at the center
of public life.
Reich, in his celebration of the Law Firm World, seeks to hold
on to the legal idealism he associates with Justice Hugo Black,
with whom he has clerked. The dreamlphantasy/reverie nature
of Reich's ideals about law are best captured in his descriptions
of his clerkship with Justice Black."° Reich reveals:
I never stopped marveling that here I was, sitting at
dinner with Justice Black and talking about freedom of
speech while the Justice divided a steak three ways, and
we passed the corn sticks and greens. I told myself:
When you recognize a moment that is an authentic part
of your dream, you have to give it all the passionate
belief that it deserves.
We sat in the kitchen at breakfast, eating the eggs the
Justice had cooked, while he read aloud from The Wash-
ington Post or talked about the Constitution. The sun
streamed in through the windows of the small,
low-ceilinged, old-fashioned room, that looked out on a
garden. There sat the grand old man, in pajamas and
bathrobe, his face serious and majestic, talking about the
103. Id. at 26.
104. See also STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTuE 32 (1974).
Because our freedom of choice is actually very limited, we are constantly
tempted to engage in fantastic reverie in order to protect ourselves from the
unpleasant realities of our existence. Confronted by the fact that our lives are
bounded by chance and death, we anxious and self-preoccupied people
construct a veil to conceal the essential pointlessness of our existence. To be
human is to create illusion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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framers of the Constitution and the deep and terrible
experience out of which had been born the protections of
the Bill of Rights. He foresaw that we would become "a
nation of clerks" if we could not remember what it meant
to be a free people. And I knew this was my unique and
magical moment to sit with the Prophet, the old man of
the American Testament, and absorb his stern passion,
his belief in truth, and carry it forward when I could."15
In this Blackesque/Reichian phantasy world, the Law
Prophets, with passion and truth, wield law to make us free.
Reality and fiction, legal practice and legal ideal, come together
in a world that is whole. In the world that Reich shared with
Justice Black, law work and the dream of law are one. The
sacred ideals associated with law and the profane world in which
they must be lived out, made real, have become, in Reich's time
with Justice Black, fused into a lived truth, a reality constituted
of dreams. The law is a field of dreams, a world where law makes
it possible for the lion to lie with the lamb.
Reich finds, in his Law Firm World, that the phantasy of law
he shared with Justice Black and the grand comforts of privilege
and power of the Law Firm World are undermined by underlying
destructive forces. "The atmosphere in the firm was so often full
of tension, overconcern, and uncomfortable pressure ..... o6
Reich prepares legal documents which are inevitably "met with
some objections from the senior men."1 °7 The senior men want
emphasis and strong language. The pressure results in overreac-
tion and loss of objectivity. "The opposition were always 'those
sons of bitches' or 'those bastards' or worse."0' The position in
legal briefs was restated, reworked, edited, and then redone, using
every ounce of one's energy and reserves. The stance, voice, and
105. REICH, supra note 19, at 25. See also, Seymour Wishman's reflections on a
revered judge with whom he had clerked, who, on closer scrutiny, had covered over the
conflicts which underlay his convictions and practices as a judge. See WISHMAN, supra
note 41, at 7-9.
106. REICH, supra note 19, at 27.
107. Id. On the relation of young lawyers to senior partners, see AUCHINCLOSS, supra
note 3, at 3-11, 15-29.
108. REICH, supra note 19, at 28; see also JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE ASSOCIATES
(1979). Osborn's description of Lynch, the partner with which young Samuel Watson must
learn to work, is the highlight of this otherwise disappointing novel. See, OSBORN, supra,
at 9-14, 26-31, 34-42, 227-32.
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zealousness demanded of Reich in the Law Firm World requires
aggressive overstatement, the stance of a zealot. The "larger
objectives" of the Law Firm World, legal thinking and client
interest, demand arguments and writings that push Reich into a
way of life that was, he says, "not necessarily in me." '09 It is a
life that calls for a "certainty" he did not possess." '
To escape the Law Firm World, Reich retreats to the "sanctu-
ary" of the Supreme Court library which feels like a "place of
worship."'
In the library of the Supreme Court--ornate, rich,
magnificent, and hushed-I could have an immensely
long and splendid wooden table to myself and the grave
courtesy of attendants; even the washroom was of marble
and scrupulously clean .... It was like the interior of a
place of worship .... [Hiere all was dignity, repose and
silence, with ornamented chairs and table lamps, carpet-
ed floor and carved woodwork." 2
Only by removing himself physically from the Law Firm World.
can Reich recapture and hold on to the idealized sense of law
imparted by Justice Black.
The assault on Reich's fused law/dream image is present in
virtually every interaction in the law firm. It was a world in
which no limits were observed, where every conversation became
an "oratory contest.""' Lawyers in the firm listened to others
speak so they could make clever, amusing, brilliant replies, using
every communication as if it were an edict of a profession or
public self. The result was "a fundamental lack of limits" where
language lost its meaning."
4
Reich laments the cost of this overdetermined partisanship.
The constant effort to overemphasize, to make every possible
argument for every client, to create a strong (winning) case, to
make every pronouncement take on the appearance of truth, takes
its toll. Reich, speaking now of his colleagues, says they took
109. REICH, supra note 19, at 28.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 33-34.
112. Id. at 34.
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id. at 30, 35.
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positions "with what seemed to be their heart and soul."" 5
With such partisan zeal "there was little room left for a 'real'
person to show himself."" 6 "One put one's entire self-writing,
voice, manner, personality, personal appeal, even physical
stance-at the service of the matter at hand. One coated over
one's real self with a public self .... 7 The Law Firm World
prizes pretense, appearance, and dramatic overstatement; it
centers life on the ego and away from the warning signals
provided to us by our feelings, by the intuitions of the inner world
and inner self.
Reich uses the persona he calls Charlie to protect a different
self, Charles, that he shields from his colleagues and the alien-
ation of the Law Firm World. "My true self was masked by
Charlie's smiling, seeming agreeableness that tactfully avoided
stirring up useless trouble.""' Charles, the private self,
believed in the basic goodness of people" 9 and was in constant
conflict with the hard-nosed attitudes and aggressive lawyer
analytics of Charlie's world. Charlie the lawyer represents a
mature, competent, adult self, while Charles represents an inner
Child who "wanted to stop feeling grown up and responsible." 2 °
If our inner Child is a source of inspiration or wisdom, as it
115. Id. at 28.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 41.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 43. The compartmentalization of professional and private lives, maintained
initially for functional and social purposes, is reassembled psychologically as a feature of
the interior world. The defensive creation of two identities, Charlie and Charles, to deal
with two social worlds, is supported by an interior splitting of inner Child and inner
Parent. Id. at 21. The inner Child and inner Parent develop autonomous and conflicting
orientations to the world. Reich, the adult, experiences an inner, wayward Child who will
not behave. Id. At the same time, his life is "dominated" by an inner Parent who sees "life
as a progression from an uncivilized childhood state to one of maturity." Id. This
psychologically interiorized parent orders him to "grow up." Id. By the time Reich leaves
his position as a Yale law professor and moves to Berkeley, he finds that "[t]his stiffness
in me was central to my initial state of mind. It was the Great Negator in full control, the
person who automatically says no." Id. at 120.
The "child in me," says Reich, is frightened, extreme, stubborn, gleeful, and needs
support. Id. at 21. The inner Child has become for Reich a constant critic of both his
inner Adult and the Charlie identity he has adopted for the Law Firm World. The lawyer
self, Charlie, is cut-off from the inner Child. "I thought the more that showed of the real
Charles within-that Charles of fears, anxieties, childishness, glee, despair, awkwardness,
eagerness, terror-the less acceptable I would appear. I wanted to become a different
person-polished, smooth, capable, confident." Id. at 88.
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sometimes is, it is seriously trampled and stifled by the strategies
of adult life premised on the aggressions (and transgressions) of
legal work.12' The compartmentalization, in Reich's case, is
unstable and threatening. The "public self" that Reich adopts as
the Charlie persona becomes threatening when it becomes the
"only real self."'22
Reich, his identification with the Law Firm World failing,
found that he could not "regain any sense of self when the
working day was over.""z "[Mly real self was driven far
inside." 24 Reich's pathology is shared by his colleagues in the
Law Firm World who "embraced" their legal persona, and "ate
and drank" of Law Firm life; "it was life and love to them."'25
The problem for Reich, and perhaps his colleagues, is that the
powerful, ego-driven, legal persona drives out secondary concerns
expressed in the weak voice of non-lawyer self that is devalued..
The totality of Law Work and Law World usurps the self of
lawyers as it destroys consciousness attuned to the totalizing
effect of the work.
Reich begins to take seriously his unhappiness and the cost
of repressing Charles, the keeper of secrets, longings, fears (and
ideals). 2 " Reich's diagnosis of Law Firm work is also directed
to other lawyers whose success has made them "victims" of their
work."'27 "Our work was detrimental to us, in the most profound
way. The moments of enjoying work did not last very long."128
Reich is diagnosing not just a personal pathology but a pathology
of the legal profession and the culture that promotes it.
129
121. See THOMAS MOORE, CARE OF THE SOUL: A GUIDE FOR CULTIVATING DEPTH AND
SACREDNESS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 49-54 (1992) (summarizing briefly the Jungian perspective
on the inner Child).
122. REICH, supra note 19, at 28.
123. Id. at 30.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 29.
126. The ideals of Charles have been problematized by their dream-like nature. They
are, from the language Reich has used to describe them, unrealistic, that is, unrealizable
in any real world legal practice.
127. REICH, supra note 19, at 27.
128. Id.
129. Seymour Wishman, in his "confessions" of a criminal lawyer, contends that his
"distress" from reflecting on the moral aspects of his practices is "not just a personal
matter" but"revealed some of the painful moral and emotional dilemmas of my profession."
WISHMAN, supra note 41, at 18. Reich makes a similar move when he describes the
doctrine of rewards-take the path that society offers and the rewards will be yours-he
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Reich copes with the absence of limits in the Law Firm World
and his unstable accommodation of inner and outer worlds by
numbing himself. "There was one part of me who walked through
each day at the office with a tense, set determination, numb to
the cries of pain or anger within myself. I could bear anything,
endure anything, and do my job."'30 Numbing is necessary to
deal with the truth:
The truth was that I was spending my life in ways
that were never what I really wanted to do. I did not
want to be in Washington, I did not want to work for a
law firm or even be a lawyer, I did not feel drawn toward
the people I spent time with. I wanted to be somewhere
else, doing something totally different .... 131
Self-numbing is an effective, but temporary, shield against the
excessive practices of the Law Firm World.
Reich's autobiography presents the story of a man who tries,
as did Ivan Ilych and many of us, to create separate identities for
observes that this belief was not his alone but "a belief held by many of my generation."
REICH, supra note 19, at 22. He goes on to describe his years as a lawyer in Washington
as a kind of Limbo, a personal ordeal, but also one experienced by many of his generation.
Reich observes that they "accepted the idea of being in Limbo, even for years, as a valid
way of getting to a good place." Id.
Jean Baptiste-Clamence in The Fall describes his strategy of linking his failings to those
of the reader:
Covered with ashes, tearing my hair, my face scored by clawing, but with
piercing eyes, I stand before all humanity recapitulating my shames without
losing sight of the effect I am producing, and saying: "I was the lowest of the
low." Then imperceptibly I pass from the "I" to the "we." When I get to "This
is what we are," the trick has been played and I can tell them off. I am like
them, to be sure; we are in the soup together. However, I have a superiority
in that I know it and this gives me the right to speak. You see the advantage,
I am sure. The more I accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you.
Even better, I provoke you into judging yourself, and this relieves me of that
much of the burden.
CAMUS, supra note 26, at 140.
130. REICH, supra note 19, at 32-33.
131. Id. at 36. It will be easy for some readers to deal with Reich's anguish: "If you
feel so badly about the practice of law then you should abandon it." This facile response
may turn out to be more uncaring than realistic. There are many reasons we continue in
work, relations, and places that wound us. The failure to recognize that we are all, always,
in danger of numbing ourselves to the truth of our desires results in a misreading of
Reich's story.
Pathologizing Professional Life
different worlds. 132  The effort to maintain his identities as
Charlie, the "Young Lawyer" and Charles, the man of secret fears
and longings, became over time neurotic rather than realistic.
The legal persona created by Reich was initially a phantasy of a
desired self and at the same time a psychological defense against
an undesired self. For Reich, however, the legal persona was not
adequate protection from himself. (The persona fails his col-
leagues as well, but for different reasons.)
Reich's story offers an intriguing portrait of a lawyer, at once
a consummate insider and totally alienated. 133 To deal with the
incongruity of his contradictory selves, Reich finds that he has
become a spy. 3 4  "[I]n secret I was a spy from another world,
able to see that world of Washington, D.C.-the people in it, and
even myself in the role of a young lawyer-as a spy might see it,
from the inside, but with an outsider's eye." 3 '
For Reich, being a lawyer/spy gives rise to desperation. "I
could not be sure," says Reich, "of ever getting away" from the
"alien territory" of the Law Firm World, "or ever finding a
different world beyond." 3N Reich, the lawyer/spy is trapped in
the world on which he is spying; he is cut off from home. Reich,
a spy without a portfolio, without a psychological home, is unable
to wield the spy metaphor into an authentic way of life.
How is one to make an authentic way of life as a lawyer?
132. How does the life of one world affect our life in the other world? What
contributions does one world make to the other? What kind of energies do the various
strategies for moving between the worlds require? What filters and screens do we use to
insure that matters of one world do not leach into (contaminate) the other world? How
effective are the walls we construct to maintain the compartmentalization of the different
worlds? How are the barriers that keep the worlds apart constructed and with what social
and psychological resources? How is the compartmentalization experienced (which is
different from asking how it is lived)? We not only live compartmentalization: we use it,
rely on it, embrace it, imagine it as a necessity, figure its costs, promote it as a boon to
productivity and efficiency, and fear it (in its capacity to impoverish or destroy our lives).
133. Reich provides the following assessment of the dangers of alienation:
To be subject to alienation is to lose self-knowledge. The more our minds,
thought processes, feelings, and capacities become the victims of damage and
depletion, the less we are able to remember that we were or could be different.
All of our beliefs about ourselves, other people, and the surrounding "reality"
of the world change without our knowing it.
REICH, supra note 19, at 9.
134. Id. at 20.
135. Id. This dual way of seeing-from "in' as well as "out-is a kind of seeing that
Stanley Fish denies is possible. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH 23-25, 295 (1994); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 215-46 (1989).
136. REICH, supra note 19, at 20.
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Reich frames the questions this way: "Could one make a life out
of this? Could one be a hired knife-thrower and enjoy it? For
what pay or for what prestige could it make sense for a person to
spend his days this way?"137 Reich's analysis of his professional
life puts the pathology of the Law Firm World into focus. "In my
law practice there was no grandeur, no public service, no commit-
ment to a cause. No people to be close to. No sky, no sea, no
forests, no mountains."13  Whatever potentially rich and
complex life one might imagine making of the varied psychological
temperaments of different identities (one for the office and one for
life outside the law office, with their reciprocal and at times
antagonistic logics) this life has eluded Reich. The two-identity
strategy has lead, in Reich's case, to psychic numbing and
disaffection. 139  The compartmentalized life has become a
pathological life, a life lived in constant fear of collapse and
failure.
IV.
I turn now to another narrative, a story told by Alice Koller.
Koller is a fearless explorer of the psychological wasteland
presented in the Ilych and Reich stories. Koller writes about her
life, in her powerful narrative of self-reflection, in a way that a
lawyer interested in self-discovery and who seeks to understand
the pathologies of his or her profession might find helpful.
Koller makes clear what she has set out to do: "I have to try
to unearth from that massive deception I practiced on myself the
things that were true. Real."14 ° Ivan Ilych was faced with a
similar task, a task for which he was unprepared. We are all,
some of course more than others, practitioners of the kind of
self-deception that Koller and Ilych practice. Lawyers, by reason
of their profession, may face an even greater danger of
137. Id. at 36-37.
138. Id. at 37; see also GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GERRY SPENCE GUNNING FOR
JUSTICE (1982) (telling a rare lawyer story that has sky, rivers, and mountains).
139. In order to do the work that Reich describes he numbs a part of himself, and
walks through the day, doing the job, "with a tense, set determination, numb to the cries
of pain or anger." REICH, supra note 19, at 32. It is this numbing of self that makes it
possible to do the work and participate in the conversations. "I told myself, accept
whatever the job brings with it, so long as you work here." Id. at 33.
140. ALICE KOLLER, AN UNKNOWN WOMAN: A JOURNEY TO SELF-DISCOVERY 109
(Bantam 1983) (1981).
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self-deception than did Koller, the non-lawyer. Lawyers, then,
might find Koller's story instructive on the practice of self-conceal-
ment so prevalent in professional life.
Koller promises to do the very thing that might have saved
Ilych from himself, to engage in the kind of psychological explora-
tion that might make it possible to learn how her life works. She
takes seriously the disaffections and misdirections in her life and
recounts them to herself and the reader so that she can learn the
truth-at least a more far-reaching truth than that to which she
had access before her self-explorations.
Alice Koller begins her inquiry by asking whether she is "one
Me." 14' The question Koller poses about having a "one Me"
should not sound peculiar to a student of law or a lawyer. Indeed,
one of the common features of contemporary legal education and
law practice is the experience of conflict, of being split, pulled in
different directions, holding forth as different selves when we do
legal work and when we are away from the work. Koller's story
provides a detailed, relentless, descriptive self-diagnosis of a
fragmented life. She diagnoses and explores, with clinical
precision, the pathologies that envelope her.
For lawyers, the question Koller puts to herself about the
absence of a "one Me" can be put this way: Are you the same
person at the office as you are at home? 142  Or is it possible
that, like Ilych and Reich, you see home and law office as
representing two different worlds, requiring different kinds of
conversation, thought, and feeling? There is, in legal ethics
circles, the notion that law constitutes a world apart, a world that
calls for a different morality in the law office than the one we use
in our private lives.
Robert Service is an example of a lawyer who subscribed to
a dual sense of morality, a legal morality that he employed in his
corporate takeover practice and a kinder, gentler (ordinary)
morality in his life with Alice, his wife. Service, of course, viewed
this dual morality to be far more a success than did either his
wife, or Blanders Blakelock, Service's colleague at the law firm.
141. Id. at 26. This question-about one Me-is central to the Charles Reich
narrative.
142. One of the things that the children of Atticus Finch learned is that their father,
a lawyer, was the same man in town practicing law as he was at home with them. See
HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1976) (1960); see also Thomas
L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PImt. L. REV. 181 (1981) (providing
a commentary on Atticus Finch's moral character); Elkins, supra note 41, at 740-43.
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The despair that Ivan Ilych experienced arose in part because he
assumed his compartmentalized lawyer life had been a success.
But he found, ultimately, that it blocked him from understanding
what he needed to know. Charles Reich found that the compart-
mentalization he used to deal with his personal pathology was
also a central feature of the Law Firm World. For both Ilych and
Reich, the compartmentalization, initially functional and instru-
mental, turns pathological.
Many law students and lawyers take pride in the way they
are able to compartmentalize and split their lives between the
demands of professional work and private life. The pride, when
it exceeds the demands of reality, can be psychological fool's work.
If we are not to become fools doing what we think we know best,
living our own lives, then we might take heed of a story like
Koller's.
Koller decides to retreat, to isolate herself so she can begin to -
find out how her life has come to its present impasse. 43 The
problem as she diagnoses it is that she doesn't really know what
is going on in her life, in particular "what's going on inside
[her]."'" As Koller says, "I just don't know what my own
feelings are.... I don't know what to look for inside me. I don't
know how to identify that I'm feeling something, let alone to give
a name to it. I think I've been anesthetized, deadened." 45 Like
Charles Reich, Koller has become numb to feeling.
Koller's condition may be of especial interest to lawyers who
cultivate, as a professional virtue, the habit of suppressing their
feelings in order to zealously represent their clients. One way to
do what lawyers are routinely asked to do is to anesthetize
yourself, to cut yourself off from your feelings (so that, over time,
you can avoid the experience of incongruence between feeling and
action, inner and outer self, self and other). When we lose touch
143. Solitude is not only a central theme in Koller's story but fundamental to the
analytics she practices on her "Journey to Self-discovery." KOLLER, supra note 140.
Lawyers who place themselves at the center of things, in the middle of the action, might
consider the need for solitude, for a retreat. On retreat we get away to some distant
(other) place for contemplation, reflection, and conversation with ourselves. Getting away
from what we normally do and expect, we find a place and time (a space in time) where
we are not bound by appearance, routine, expectation, and assumption. We must get away
because our lives become entangled with habits and routines, and a sense of necessity that
colonizes our life and thinking.
144. Id. at 112.
145. Id.
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with our feelings we lose touch with a part of the self that is
providing commentary on the choices we are making. If we no
longer know what it is we feel, then how are we to judge what we
do, and whether our actions constitute the worthwhile profession-
al life we phantasize we are living? How are we to reconcile our
lives and stories with the good we claim for them?
Alice Koller, in her autobiography of a fragmented life, takes
up the story when she was thirty-seven years old and had just
managed to get a Harvard Ph.D. in philosophy. 14' But, like
Reich, her education has not made her well or whole; she is
unsure of herself, and overly reliant on the opinion of others. "I
seem to believe there is no Me except in other eyes. I am what I
see in your eyes, whoever you are." 14' The problem, Koller
discovers, is that she sees the world through the eyes of others,
their smiles and compliments, and when they dry up, she has no
way of knowing who she is. 48 We lawyers are trained to see
through the eyes of others (judges, opposing counsel, the client)
and are constantly being judged by others. We practice our craft
in the judgmental presence of each other and before judges who
decide the fate of our clients.
Koller describes a life that has been (de)formed by the
constant exercise of seeing life through the eyes of others. "I just
want to find out whether there's anything in me that's genuinely
mine: my making, my doing, my choice."141 With a vision of the
world thoroughly dominated by what others think she is now
forced to ask: "Why can't I see? What's wrong with my own eyes?
If I knew how to look at what I see, then what? Then I wouldn't
146. There are hints, at several points along the way, at how the study of philosophy
and her decision to become a philosopher bear on Koller's self-diagnosis. See id. at 33, 64,
96, 216,228. Koller recognizes the impact of philosophy on her thinking and self-reflection.
See id. at 81, 87-88, 107-08. At one point Koller realizes:
that all the years I made myself sit over philosophy books, examine
philosophers' reasoning, set out my own reasoning for a teacher to exam-
ine-all that accumulated discipline can now be shaped into the one tool I
need: to be able to say with perfect care whatever I want to say. I can push
my saying to the point of saying what I mean.
Id. at 33.
147. Id. at 94.
148. See JACK LONDON, MARTIN EDEN (Bantam Books 1986) (1909). London tells a
story with a direct warning about something that we know but are likely to forget, that
fame and social recognition are unreliable and often destructive.
149. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 1.
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need other people's eyes."15°
A lawyer can know the worth of a method, or the value of
anything for that matter, only if she maintains eyes to see and
ears to listen. To see herself through her own eyes, Koller turns
towards, rather than away from, the symptoms of her neurotic
condition.
It's true that I've accomplished nothing in the eyes of
people that I've let judge me. But suppose I use my own
eyes. Suppose I take myself as my judge. That doesn't
transform my failure into accomplishment, but it lets me
see what the failure was: I failed because the things I set
myself to do weren't things I chose to do. There was no
real "I" to do the choosing. That hollow creature led by
a child's heart, fighting rearguard actions all over the
place to prevent anyone from noticing: I've torn it all
away. And look what's left: this small shuddering
self.'5 '
Koller must honor the disguises and ruses she has used to
keep herself in a muddle about life by way of self-diagnosis before
she can escape the muddle she is in. It begins with the simplest
of insights, "[m]y makeup has ceased to be a subterfuge: it looks
thick and caked .... 152 The ability to see her age is a precur-
sor for the exploration of a variety of excuses: for the many years
it took her to get her Ph.D.; the failure to obtain a teaching
position; her ambivalence about teaching; and finally, her failure
to get married.
Questions of the kind Koller poses are more common than we
are willing to admit; questions some of us cannot tolerate.
Questions of this sort demand that we do what Ivan Ilych and
Robert Service do only when their lives are threatened-that we
think about who we are and how our identification as lawyers has
changed our lives. What lawyer can be free of these questions?
- When will I make it?
- Will I ever have enough money?
- Will I find a way to practice law that reflects who I want
to be?
150. Id. at 94.
151. Id. at 211.
152. Id. at 1.
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- Will I be a good lawyer?
- Will I make partner?
- Will I succeed in any kind of way that will satisfy me and
those who have had confidence in me?
- Will the sacrifices (and compromises) I make and have
already made be worth it?
Koller decides that her failures and her questions deserve
attention. If we lawyers could hold on to questions like Koller
does, and turn them into occasions for introspection and reflec-
tion, we might find that the dialogue that ensues could change
our lives and the way we practice law.15 3
When Koller sees that her makeup is thick and caked and
that her years are becoming visible to her, she awakens not only
to advancing age but aspects of her life she has concealed. The
diagnosis is stark:
I don't have a life: I'm just using up a number of days
somehow. There is no reason for me to be here. No plan
formulated at some point in the past has led me to this
void that is my day, every day. No obligation to anyone
requires me to live in this apartment, or in this city. I
don't live anywhere: I perch. . . . I despise my little
busy-work job, and yet I don't try to find something else.
I try, instead, to turn it into a permanent connection: I
must be certain of my income, at least. I must have
something certain in all this flux: no career, no home, no
man.
•.. I'm tired, from the inside out. Tired of perpetual-
ly having to fight for everything, degree, men, jobs,
money. Tired of running after things that always elude
me. 15
4
"Each thing I do during the course of a day is something I've been
told to do, or taught to do." 155 "I cannot shake off the sense of
153. See James R. Elkins, Writing Our Lives: Making Introspective Writing a Part of
Legal Education, 29 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 45 (1993) (presenting anecdotal evidence that law
students can benefit from the use of reflection and introspection in legal education); Mark
Weisberg, Learning to Trust Your Own Mind and Other Stories About (Legal) Education,
17 QUEEN'S L.J. 304 (1992).
154. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 1-2.
155. Id. at 17.
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fragmentation."'56 "The past wants to swallow me up .... '57
"I don't know how to respond to things. I shake my head impa-
tiently. No, that's not it. I don't know how I respond to things.
I don't know how to find out what's going on inside me."'58 "I
just don't know what my own feelings are.... I think I've been
anesthetized, deadened." 5 ' Koller concludes that she has
turned her entire organism into a facade 6 ° and must now take
a stand on how she wants to live, even if she cannot say how she
will do it or what kind of person she might become.
I have to replace all of it [the patterns embedded in how
she now lives] with what I choose to do. I have to learn
how to choose one thing over another, one way of doing
something over another way. That means I have to want
one thing, or one way, more than another.'6 '
To know what to choose (or even how she has chosen in the
past) and what she might now want, Koller must become an
archaeologist of the self. "I have to try to unearth from that
massive deception I practiced on myself the things that were true.
Real."'62 The task is not simple. Good intentions may not be
enough. She says, "I don't know what to look for inside me. I
don't know how to identify that I'm feeling something, let alone to
give a name to it." 6 3  It is not easy work. The outcome is
uncertain. There are pitfalls and dangers to be confronted.
She begins by becoming conscious of the most simple tasks,
trying to do what she wants to do while quieting the voices that
have dominated her. She pays attention to the color of the clothes
she wears and whether the clothes are warm; she ignores how
others might judge what she wears. She begins to focus on the
little distractions that pull her away from what she wants to do,
and the real purpose for her retreat and the decision to be
156. Id. at 25.
157. Id. at 26.
158. Id. at 111-12.
159. Id. at 112.
160. Id. at 69.
161. Id. at 17.
162. Id. at 109.
163. Id. at 112.
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alone. 6 4 She starts a journal of the outward events in her life
and attempts to force herself "to fit together" these events with
recovered memory. 165  Koller says, "I'll write down everything
I can remember, so that I can see the full extent of it, pick out
some patterns in what I've been denying for so long."'66 The
discipline she seeks is to "push [her] saying to the point of saying
what I mean."1
67
By doing this engaged memory work she begins, as did
Charles Reich, to see the possibility of restoring and recapturing
some new sense of herself."6  But there is danger in this
introspective work. Koller knows that the past can swallow her,
that she may not be able to get enough hold on herself to make
use of what memory makes available to her.'6 9
The first effort is to do something about the way she waits for
things to happen. 7 °
Waiting? Why, the stupendous thing I used to wait for
was something that was going to be done to me, or for
me: to be initiated by someone else, independently of my
choice. But there isn't a someone else to make things
happen to me: I'm the only person who can do what I
decide needs to be done. And besides, there is no reason
for anyone else to do anything at all for me, particularly
something as glorious as that thing I expected.
So on two counts waiting is irrelevant. Nothing to
wait for, because I'll initiate what happens to me.
Nothing to wait for, because these minutes now passing
are my life. They are the minutes in which my living is
to be done. Whatever I do, I'll do in my own time, and I
will do it.17
1
164. Id. at 30. Koller implies that some reflective work is best done by indirection, by
working at the margins. A frontal assault may not be the best way to discover who we are.
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id. at 33.
167. Id.
168. Koller's pathologizing is a way of inventing a new sense of self and a future (and
new story) that lies beyond failure. Readers curious about Koller's efforts to reinvent
herself can follow her story in ALICE KOLLER, STATIONS OF SOLITUDE (1990). I have not
attempted to integrate information from Stations of Solitude into this article.
169. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 26.
170. Id. at 154-55, 157, 161.
171. Id. at 213.
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Reflecting on how she sees the world through the eyes of
others, puzzling over her relationship with men and with her
parents, leads Koller to another area of practical psychological
insight.
Suddenly the two lines of ideas crash together inside
my head. The applause I played for everywhere and the
attention I made my mother give me were exactly the
same thing: substitutes for her love. I tried to make the
whole rest of the world give me what she couldn't give
me. If I were the greatest actress, maybe she'd look at
me. If I were a brilliant philosopher, maybe she'd look at
me. And if she looked at me, I'd have her attention, her
real attention, which was her affection: I'd have her love.
So of course I could never get enough attention from
other people, because they were always giving me the
wrong thing: they weren't giving me her love. I've never
believed that I'm beautiful because she never told me
that I was.'72
Koller may be unduly harsh on herself, even guilty of
overstatement, but her dramatic way of expressing this insight
signals that something is sinking in-that what she now sees is
of value, that she has discovered something that can be put to
use. There is a turning point when she avows:
I won't ever again put up with unthinking habit or being
bored, or ugliness in things or persons. I have nothing
important to do, but I have no time to waste marking
time. Each thing I touch or see or smell or taste or hear
during my day must give me the sense of something good
in the doing. 7 '
172. Id. at 104. The conclusion is both simple and profound. "I went to bed with
men," Koller now sees,
looking for her [my mother] to hold me. I was an actress and then a
philosopher, to get her to look at me .... Thirty-seven years of being blind.
Deaf. Marking time on the same spot. A little girl looking for her mother to
hold her. Everything else is fraud.
Id. at 164. Koller gets to the core of her neurosis by seeing how she has lived her life in
an elusive search for substitutes for love from parents who made her feel like a "dwarf."
Id. at 165.
173. Id. at 212-13.
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The truth, for Koller's revisioned self, lies not in the need to
blame others for her fate, but in the discovery of a motif that has
dominated her life. 174 Koller has found the plot that makes her
life story understandable and livable: "all the fragments" of her
life "have been tied into one bundle by one single strand" that
held her together without her knowing it, a way of living and "a
way of being whole that nullifies thirty-seven years."75 The
understanding that there is a unifying theme in her life contra-
dicts a view that Koller has previously held of herself:
I've thought of myself as being a different person depend-
ing upon what I was doing, who was talking to me, where
I was. A different person to each man; different when I
talk to a teacher from when I talk to a friend; different
depending upon whether I'm walking through the snow
or walking into an expensive restaurant.17
6
Koller had assumed she was doing something that lawyers took
pride in doing. But she learns that her skills at adopting
different identities were not as pronounced as she had assumed.
Koller now detects what has been missing, but it requires
that she understand that her purposes have been unclear, her
wants unrelated to her feelings, her feelings muted and numbed.
The insight is rooted in her new ability to see how she has used
words to cover up and maintain a personable facade. "Half of the
words I've uttered in my life have probably been some sort of
stuffing: to fill the void, to be polite, to be agreeable."'77 Koller's
deformed self is linked to an impoverishment of language, a way
of talking that was itself pathological. 17  We regain psychologi-
174. Koller has discovered what psychiatrist Donald Spence calls "narrative truth."
See DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL TRUTH: MEANING AND
INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1982).
175. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 165.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 235.
178. Charles Reich points to the way lawyers talk and their conversations with each
other as a sign of the pathology that lurks in our midst:
[At lunch with other young lawyers] [w]e talked about politics, but it seemed
as if they were simply making an effort to sound clever and amusing. The
young men waited eagerly for a chance to seize the center of the conversational
stage. They did not really listen to each other, they prepared their own
remarks for the moment when the person who was speaking finished. They
listened only for the purpose of replying. What they said seemed always to be
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cal health when we reestablish an appropriate relationship with
words we are using, with the story we are telling.
Koller finds self-reflection healing.17 9 She learns that she
is not destined to be forever disappointed. Koller is looking for a
way to live that will reawaken her feelings, help her recognize
what is going on inside so she can maintain a sense of purpose, a
sense that her life has a purpose. Koller's self-reflection is a case
study in soul-making.8 °
addressed not to the others at the table, but to some invisible judge or
authority figure. So even at a casual moment, when there was no authority
present, the conversation continued to be an oratory contest, the brilliant
speakers impatiently waiting their chance to earn an A in Lunch.
REICH, supra note 19, at 29.
179. Self-reflection can, in contrast to its healing potential, "swallow" you, KOLLER,
supra note 140, at 26, and just become another role, another way of acting, another
pretense. Id. at 50. For Koller's reflections on the dangers of self-reflection, see id. at 12,
52, 121, 136, 147, 166, 170, 215, 221, 235.
180. James Hillman argues:
Therapy, or analysis, is not only something that analysts do to patients; it is
a process that goes on intermittently in our individual soul-searching, our
attempts at understanding our complexities, the critical attacks, prescriptions,
and encouragements that we give ourselves. We are all in therapy all the time
insofar as we are involved with soul-making.
JAMES HILLMAN, RE-VISIONING PSYCHOLOGY at xviii (1976). For Hillman, soul-making is
related to psychology, a psychology of reflection. "The soul's first habitual activity is
reflection.... ." Id. at 117. We might note here that Koller's story is told in the language
of psychology, in the Freudian language of neurosis. The story could be told in other
languages, and the crisis described in other terms, for example, in spiritual or political
(e.g., feminist) language. Politics and spirituality are still other connections to the soul,
but it is the psychological that Koller uses for her story. Koller's psychologized story takes
us into and through an interior landscape; a story that "returns to the soul." Id. It is in
a psychologized story that we re-view, re-present, and re-vision "where we already are" and
"discover the psyche speaking imaginally in what we had been taking for granted as literal
and actual descriptions." Id. at 127. Psychologizing has the power that it does, as Hillman
explains it, because it "justifies itself." "As we penetrate or try to bring out, expose, or
show why, we believe that what lies behind or within is truer and more real, powerful, or
valuable than what is evident." Id. at 140. Psychologized reflections provide a
"countereducation." Id.
Donald P. Spence, drawing on his psychoanalytic training, confirms the connection
that Hillman makes between psychologizing and stories:
There seems no doubt but that a well-constructed story possesses a kind of
narrative truth that is real and immediate and carries an important signifi-
cance for the process of therapeutic change .... [Niarrative truth by itself
seems to have a significant impact on the clinical process.
SPENCE, supra note 174, at 21-22. Spence goes on to say of narrative truth, that it can be
defined as:
the criterion we use to decide when a certain experience has been captured to
our satisfaction; it depends on continuity and closure and the extent to which
the fit of the pieces takes on an aesthetic finality. Narrative truth is what we
have in mind when we say that such and such is a good story, that a given
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Koller has come a long way, as she works toward understand-
ing how her life works, and how she can put the results of her
reflection to work. The conclusions are both simple and profound:
On my way upstairs, I find myself smiling. Twice now in
the last two days I've found myself smiling. I shake my
head in disbelief ....
I have a peculiar sense of newness. I'm not sure what
it is. I have the feeling that the words that come to me
are new....
•... The sense of newness now is that the script is
gone. I find myself thinking. I find myself talking. My
words don't follow a prearranged pattern. They surprise
me, even as I speak or think. Their unexpectedness
catches my own attention, and, examining them, I
discover what I mean to say.
I know what it is: I'm not being tested any longer. I've
stopped submitting myself to an unending examination
that I keep failing, question by question, letting the
accretion of terror from past failures foredoom the next
failure and therefore further terror. That's gone, that
perduring sense of catastrophe, both present and impend-
explanation carries conviction, that one solution to a mystery must be true.
Once a given construction has acquired narrative truth, it becomes just as real
as any other kind of truth ....
Id. at 31.
Hillman argues that we attend to the soul by attending to its pathologized condition.
This is the way Hillman puts it:
Each soul at some time or another demonstrates illusions and depressions,
overvalued ideas, manic flights and rages, anxieties, compulsions, and
perversions. Perhaps our psychopathology has an intimate connection with our
individuality, so that our fear of being what we really are is partly because we
fear the psychopathological aspect of individuality. For we are each peculiar;
we have symptoms; we fail, and cannot see why we go wrong or even where,
despite high hopes and good intentions. We are unable to set matters right,
to understand what is taking place or be understood by those who would try.
Our minds, feelings, wills, and behaviors deviate from normal ways. Our
insights are impotent, or none come at all. Our feelings disappear in apathy;
we worry and also don't care. Destruction seeps out of us autonomously and
we cannot redeem the broken trusts, hopes, loves.
HILLMAN, supra, at 55. Hillman contends that it is "[w]hen you feel beaten, oppressed,
knocked back... then something moves and you begin to feel yourself as a soul. You don't
feel yourself as a soul when you're making it and doing it." JAMES HILLMAN, INTER VIEWS
11 (1983). "The soul builds its endurance, its 'stamina'... through hopelessness and
depression." Id. at 19.
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ing. In its place is a sense of exploring, of tentativeness,
almost of. daring.... The question has stopped being
whether I shall fail or succeed. Now it's merely whether
the thing I'm doing is new or interesting. I can even
make mistakes and call them "mistakes," instead of
immediately considering them calamities.'8 '
I know where I end and where other people begin.
I hear them [others who speak] because I don't
get in my own way. I never understood what other
people were doing because my needs made a barrier
between me and any other person. But now I've torn
away those unfulfillable needs. I deal with problems in
this new way that I work out as I go along, and suddenly
people themselves stand forth clearly to me in the very
space where I used to see only mirrors. Incredible!"8 2
I follow Koller into her bleak pathologized world for two
reasons. First, she uses self-reflection to rethink her life, to heal
some of the wounds that shaped her fate. Second, I trust Alice
Koller as a teacher about those parts of the self that we most
want to ignore or deny. With Koller, as with Reich and Ilych, we
confront directly this issue of trust. Can I trust the author of this
narration of pathology to teach me something about the world, a
world about which I often assume to know more than I actually
do?1
83
To read Alice Koller requires that we cultivate trust, knowing
how vulnerable it is, and how often trust is betrayed. When
Koller begins this story of how she became "unknown" to herself,
I decide early on that I can trust her.8 4 I may change my mind
181. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 214-15.
182. Id. at 240.
183. Is it possible, by attending to the story of Alice Koller, that I might experience in
a different way the relation of my own success and failure? If I can understand the
pathologized condition described by Alice Koller, and her world, can I better understand
my own life?
184. Reading Alice Koller with others, I find that some readers do not trust her. For
example, Koller reaches a point where she actively contemplates suicide. Koller has been
careful to point out that self-reflection has its dangers and for Koller taking her own life
may be one of them. Koller, as she begins to reflect seriously on the mess that her life has
become, sees suicide as a rational and defensible way out-life fragmented and splintered,
a life in which too much energy had been invested in a facade ultimately was a life, for
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about her. I may be betrayed. I may learn that I cannot trust
her when she talks about her life the way she does, or I may learn
that my own judgment about who and what to trust are misguid-
ed. Over the years, I have learned to trust Alice Koller and her
relentless pathologizing.'8 5
V.
The protagonist and narrator of Albert Camus's novel, The
Fall, introduces himself to a patron in an Amsterdam bar as
Jean-Baptiste Clamence---"a lawyer before coming here."186 "A
few years ago," says Clamence, "I was a lawyer in Paris and,
indeed, a rather well-known lawyer."187  And now, says
Clamence, I am a "judge-penitent.""'
To the stranger in the bar, Clamence asks, "May I, monsieur,
Koller, not worth living. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 170-71, 198-200, 205-10.
Some readers respond negatively to Koller's story, first because they have no experience
with the kind of relentless self-critique that Koller pursues and second, because her
self-diagnosis is so bleak. The reader may respond to Koller's pathologizing and talk of.
suicide with one or another moralism: What do you mean, your life is a mess and you want
to end it? The mess you are in is by comparison a small mess. It could be worse, much
worse. And what makes you think your life is so bad? You have simply miscalculated how
bad things are and how bad they can be. Alice, buck up, get on with it. You have elevated
the rumblings in your own psyche to a justification for ending your life. Can you not see
that you have deluded yourself? There is arrogance in the hope that you can (or should)
be free of anguish, uncertainty, and knowledge of your own complicity in the mess of your
life. What you seek is impossible, a freedom that lies beyond human possibility. You have
got it all wrong.
185. While Koller has learned a great deal about her life, and has become my teacher
in doing so, she argues that her new awareness cannot be taught.
It can't be taught, but it can be learned. You have only to set yourself to be
both teacher and learner at the same time. What you learn is something true
of yourself alone. The reason no one else can teach it to you is that anyone
else who has such knowledge knows only something which is true of himself,
of herself, alone, too. Should it be called "knowledge" at all, then, since it
concerns what is unique, as every self is?
Id. at 216.
186. CAMUS, supra note 26, at 8.
187. Id. at 17.
188. Id. at 8. Clamence repeats the self-description but remains cryptic about what
he means by "judge-penitent."
I have already told you, I am a judge-penitent. Only one thing is simple in my
case: I possess nothing. Yes, I was rich. No, I shared nothing with the poor.
What does that prove? That I, too, was a Sadducee .... Oh, do you hear the
foghorns in the harbor? There'll be fog tonight on the Zuider Zee.
Id. at 10.
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offer my services without running the risk of intruding?"189
What services, one wonders, can this lawyer offer anyone? The
bar patron does not respond, either to this question, or to any that
are put to him as Clamence commences his story. Faced with the
stranger's silent assent, Clamence begins what the reader is soon
to learn is a confessional monologue. Basically, Clamence is a
man who cannot stop talking, cannot stop observing his past life
and reporting his observations to us. As Clamence, commenting
on his own pathologizing, puts it, "I seize any and every
opportunity."9 ° Clamence's intrusion on the stranger's solitude
(the setting of the story is a virtually abandoned Amsterdam bar)
is paralleled by Clamence's intrusion into the secure world of the
reader. Bar patron and reader alike are lured into serving as an
audience for Clamence's labored efforts to discover the truth about
his life. 19'
Clamence, a lawyer of "noble cases," specializes in the
fortunes of "[w]idows and orphans."' 92
I was truly above reproach in my professional life. I
never accepted a bribe, it goes without saying, and I
never stooped either to any shady proceedings.
And-this is even rarer-I never deigned to flatter any
journalist to get him on my side, nor any civil servant
whose friendship might be useful to me. I even had the
luck of seeing the Legion of Honor offered to me two or
three times and of being able to refuse it with a discreet
dignity in which I found my true reward. Finally, I never
charged the poor a fee and never boasted of it. Don't
think for a moment, cher monsieur, that I am bragging.
I take no credit for this. The avidity [eagerness, greed]
which in our society substitutes for ambition has always
made me laugh. I was aiming higher....'1
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. at 5.
191. Before the monologue ends Clamence raises a question about whether his
companion in the bar is real or imagined. Clamence, under the influence of a fever, says
of the confession, the companion, and his life: "I may have lived or only dreamed." Id. at
127. But would it matter? Some memories and dreams are like rocks hurled from the
unconscious. Companion or not, we readers sit in the bar along with Clamence, listening
to his story. Our listening has made it real.
192. Id. at 17.
193. Id. at 19-20.
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He is not just a lawyer trying to do good, but righteous about
virtue, he is "[a] real tornado!"194
You would really have thought that justice slept with me
every night. I am sure you would have admired the
rightness of my tone, the appropriateness of my emotion,
the persuasion and warmth, the restrained indignation of
my speeches before the court. Nature favored me as to
my physique, and the noble attitude comes effortlessly.
Furthermore, I was buoyed up by two sincere feelings:
the satisfaction of being on the right side of the bar and
an instinctive scorn for judges in general. 95
Clamence is a man with a satisfied conscience; he is what we now
call "politically correct." "The feeling of the law, the satisfaction
of being right, the joy of self-esteem, cher monsieur, are powerful
incentives for keeping us upright or keeping us moving for-
ward."'9 6 Clamence reports: "I have never felt comfortable
except in lofty places. Even in the details of daily life, I needed
to feel above."'9 7 Clamence contends that his life was an
achievement that rose above "the vulgar ambitious man . . . to
that supreme summit where virtue is its own reward." 9 ' It is
at these "heights" and "lofty places" of "supreme summits" that
Clamence has staked out a life.
What could go wrong in such a life, a life defined by devotion
to virtue? We know, from Clamence's introduction of himself, the
locale in which his story is being told, and the way the story
begins, that something has gone wrong. But before we find out
how Clamence has gone astray, and for his having done so to have
any emotional impact on us, we must learn what kind of person
he is, something of his character, and how his efforts at virtue
have been born out in the way he lives.
In the beginning, before his days in Amsterdam bars,
Clamence says, "you can already imagine my satisfaction. I
enjoyed my own nature to the fullest .... ,"99 "I took pleasure
194. Id. at 17.
195. Id. at 17-18.
196. Id. at 18.
197. Id. at 23.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 20.
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in life and in my own excellence."2" It was, says Clamence, a
life "lived with impunity."'O° A life "shielded from judgment as
from penalty . . .. 2 There was, he says, "no intermediary
between life and me;" 03 it was a life blessed by happiness and
pleasure and contentment with lofty heights, heights that Charles
Reich describes but experiences only in fleeting moments.
Clamence, unlike Reich, experiences his success "[a]t every hour
of the day;" he is able to constantly "scale the heights and light
conspicuous fires" and experience a "joyful greeting" rising toward
him.2 °4 Clamence takes "pleasure" in his "own excellence."2 5
Clamence seems overly self-conscious of his virtue, taking
satisfaction in the assumptions he makes about his own good
character.
I always enjoyed giving directions in the street, obliging
with a light, lending a hand to heavy pushcarts, pushing
a stranded car, buying a paper from the Salvation Army
lass or flowers from the old peddler, though I knew she
stole them from the Montparnasse cemetery....
Let us speak.., of my courtesy. It was famous and
unquestionable.... If I had the luck, certain mornings,
to give up my seat in the bus or subway to someone who
obviously deserved it, to pick up some object an old lady
had dropped and return it to her with a smile I knew
well, or merely to forfeit my taxi to someone in a greater
hurry than I, it was a red-letter day.20 6
It is one thing to endeavor to lead a virtuous life but another to
glory in it. We begin to suspect Clamence. What kind of person
proclaims his own goodness? Do those who do good and make a
life of it entitle themselves to self-laudatory thoughts, or does
Clamence's self-laudation in some way undermine his proclaimed
virtue? Can we claim goodness for ourselves or must we rely
upon others to render judgment on our character? Clamence says
200. Id. at 25.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 27.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 25.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 21.
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enough to speculate that his devotion to virtue puts him in danger
of what C.G. Jung called inflation, °7 an overdetermined view of
one's place in the world.
Before any attempt can be made to assess Clamence's claims
to virtue, we must listen, painful as it may be, to Clamence tell
his "inflated" story of the good life.
Familiar when it was appropriate, silent when necessary,
capable of a free and easy manner as readily as of
dignity, I was always in harmony. Hence my popularity
was great and my successes in society innumerable. I
was acceptable in appearance; I revealed myself-to be
both a tireless dancer and an unobtrusively learned man;
I managed to love simultaneously-and this is not
easy-women and justice; I indulged in sports and the
fine arts .... [J]ust imagine, I beg you, a man at the
height of his powers, in perfect health, generously gifted,
skilled in bodily exercises as in those of the mind, neither
rich nor poor, sleeping well, and fundamentally pleased
with himself without showing this otherwise than by a
felicitious sociability.
Each joy made me desire another. I went from
festivity to festivity. On occasion I danced for nights on
end, ever madder about people and life.20"
Fatigue, when he experienced it, passed and he "would rush forth
anew. I ran on like that, always heaped with favors, never
satiated, without knowing where to stop .... 2o9
Clamence was equally blessed, he tells us, in his pursuit of
happiness and virtue as a lawyer:
[the legal profession] satisfied most happily that vocation
for summits. It cleansed me of all bitterness toward my
neighbor, whom I always obligated without ever owing
207. Clamence's inflation is found in his view ofhimselffas "something of a superman,"
a "king's son," a "burning bush," as being "marked out" for success, soaring through life,
at ease in everything, having achieved a "relaxed mastery." Id. at 28, 29. Clamence is
"riding the crest of the wave." Id. at 37.
208. Id. at 27-28, 30.
209. Id. at 30.
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him anything. It set me above the judge whom I judged
in turn, above the defendant whom I forced to gratitude.
Just weigh this, cher monsieur, I lived with impunity. I
was concerned in no judgment; I was not on the floor of
the courtroom, but somewhere in the flies like those gods
that are brought down by machinery from time to time to
transfigure the action and give it its meaning. After all,
living aloft is still the only way of being seen and hailed
by the largest number.210
Being a lawyer does not hamper life's joys as it did for Charles
Reich. But rather, delight, says Clamence, has been felt "especial-
ly in my profession."21" ' Clamence's ease with success reminds
us of Ivan Ilych. It is, Clamence finds, "a result of being show-
ered with blessings," so much so, he feels "marked."212
But there are indications from Clamence himself that all was
not well. He finds that he is far less comfortable "in the details
of daily life" than "in lofty places."" 3 He has always "needed to
feel above."214 He later observes that: "I was at ease in every-
thing, to be sure, but at the same time satisfied with noth-
ing."215  Clamence, like Ilych, has been so successful that he
"never had to learn how to live."216 He says later, he has
"dreamed" himself to be a "complete man who managed to make
himself respected in his person as well as in his profession."
21 7
Clamence indeed seems blessed "until the day-until the
evening rather when the music stopped and the lights went
out."218 There is an incident one night walking home. He hears
laughter, but there is no one in sight. When Clamence reaches
his apartment, he reports: "I was dazed and had trouble breath-
ing. That evening I rang up a friend, who wasn't at home.... I
went into the bathroom to drink a glass of water. My reflection
was smiling in the mirror, but it seemed to me that my smile was
210. Id. at 25.
211. Id. at 22.
212. Id. at 29.
213. Id. at 23.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 29-30.
216. Id. at 27.
217. Id. at 54.
218. Id. at 30.
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double . . . . In "a successful life" proclaimed "without
immodesty"221 one would assume that a bit of strange laughter
of the sort Clamence reports would be readily forgotten. Not only
were Clamence's successes "innumerable"2 2' but he has a feeling
of "relaxed mastery" and "completion."222 Clamence's experience
of life seems in almost every way the reverse of Charles Reich's
and Alice Koller's. He has, in a psychological sense, everything
they Seek. How then, can strange and annoying laughter, a
doubleness of image in the bathroom mirror, be the undoings of
such a successful, satisfied man? What fate can draw a man out
of the shell of success and security?
23
After the incident involving the mysterious laughter,
Clamence finds that "a sort of silence" has descended on him and
like Ilych he seeks the advice of physicians.
224
I was waiting, I believe. . . . I also had some health
problems at that time. Nothing definite, a dejection
perhaps, a sort of difficulty in recovering my good spirits.
I saw doctors, who gave me stimulants. I was alternately
stimulated and depressed. Life became less easy for me:
when the body is sad the heart languishes. It seemed to
me that I was half unlearning what I had never learned
and yet knew so well-how to live. Yes, I think it was
probably then that everything began.225
What a thin veneer this armor of success turns out to be, pierced
so suddenly, without expectation, by laughter of the unseen!
The laughter incident evokes a memory: Clamence had
witnessed a young woman jump from a bridge and disappear in
the river.- He realizes, in retrospect, that he might have saved the
woman, but he made no attempt to do so. The strange laughter
echoes the cry of the young drowning woman as she moves
219. Id. at 39-40. Clamence says that the sign that represents his life is that of"a
double face, a charming Janus." Id. at 47.
220. Id. at 28.
221. Id. at 27.
222. Id. at 28, 39.
223. The archetypal motif of the fall of a good man is most vividly presented in the
Biblical story of Job. For a modem translation, see THE BOOK OF JOB (Stephen Mitchell
trans., 1987).
224. CAMUS, supra note 26, at 42.
225. Id. at 42-43.
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downstream to her death.22 This incident with the strange
haunting laughter takes Clamence by surprise, a surprise that
calls his life into question. The memory of the drowning woman's
death cry brings Clamence to speak more honestly of himself: "I
had the suspicion that maybe I wasn't so admirable."227
Suddenly, the all-embracing virtuous life is revealed (as the
reader has long suspected) as a cover story.
Clamence begins to see himself "bursting with vanity. I, I, I
is the refrain of my whole life, which could be heard in everything
I said. I could never talk without boasting .... 2 28  Clamence's
self-diagnosis confirms what the reader has already concluded-
there is a dark, shadow side to all this talk of self-proclaimed
virtue:
I recognized no equals. I always considered myself more
intelligent than everyone else, as I've told you, but also
more sensitive and more skillful, a crack shot, an incom-
parable driver, a better lover. . . . I admitted only
superiorities in me and this explained my good will and
serenity. When I was concerned with others, I was so out
of pure condescension ... 229
"In short, I wanted to dominate all things."20 "I discovered in
myself sweet dreams of oppression."2" "I lived my whole life
under a double code, and my most serious acts were often the
ones in which I was the least involved."23 2  "For more than
thirty years I had been in love exclusively with myself."
231
Clamence had perfected an illusion of virtue, a "fine picture" of
himself, an idealized self-image presented to the world as a
persona. Clamence has fashioned a public identity for himself
rooted in self-deception. "I had dreamed," says Clamence "of
being a complete man who managed to make himself respected in
226. Id. at 69-70.
227. Id. at 77.
228. Id. at 48.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 54.
231. Id. at 55.
232. Id. at 88-89.
233. Id. at 100.
628 [Vol. 18:581
Pathologizing Professional Life
his person as well as in his profession."234
Clamence's discovery of the truth about himself happens
"little by little" following the evening he hears the repressed
sound of the drowning woman's laughter.235 He tells us how he
begins to uncover those parts of his life that did not fit the
self-image, the shadow of his virtuous life.
First I had to recover my memory. By gradual degrees I
saw more clearly, I learned a little of what I knew. Until
then I had always been aided by an extraordinary ability
to forget. I used to forget everything, beginning with my
resolutions. Fundamentally, nothing mattered. War,
suicide, love, poverty got my attention, of course, when
circumstances forced me, but a courteous, superficial
attention. At times, I would pretend to get excited about
some cause foreign to my daily life. But basically I didn't
really take part in it except, of course, when my freedom
was thwarted. How can I express it? Everything slid
off-yes, just rolled off me.
I lived ... without any other continuity than that,
from day to day, of I, I, I. From day to day women, from
day to day virtue or vice, from day to day, like dogs-but
every day myself secure at my post. Thus I progressed
on the surface of life, in the realm of words as it were,
never in reality .... I went through the gestures out of
boredom or absent-mindedness. ...
Gradually, however, my memory returned. Or rather,
I returned to it, and in it I found the recollection that
was awaiting me.' 6
As the narrative proceeds, Clamence speaks more of his
private life, in particular his life with women. "To begin with, you
must know that I always succeeded with women-and without
much effort."" 7 But here too, Clamence has created and lived
behind a facade. Clamence tells us that he knew what women
wanted, and acted to make them believe he was the kind of
234. Id. at 54.
235. Id. at 49.
236. Id. at 49-51.
237. Id. at 56.
1994] 629
Vermont Law Review [Vol. 18:581
person that could give them what they wanted. He manipulated
them through sincerity, through his idealization of them ("setting
them so high"). 238  He loved women, but it was an odd kind of
love. Love was a "game," involving "little speech[es]" which he
had "perfected."239 The complexity of the game lay in his ability
to use a psychology of reversal: "[t]he essential part of that act
[with women] lay in the assertion, painful and resigned, that I
was nothing" and that the relationship would not work.240
Sensitive women "tried to understand me, and that effort led
them to melancholy surrenders."241 Clamence even returns to
women after long absences and repeats the process a second
time.242 The essential technique, a manipulative skill, is to
make that which is not love appear as love, a technique derived
from his ability to keep all his "affections within reach to make
us-e of them when I wanted."
243
Clamence, with his new effort at honesty, can now laugh at
himself. Moreover, he can admit that his depraved private life
with women is a reflection of his public life with its "professional
flights about innocence and justice."244 Being truthful about his
relations with women, Clamence can no longer deceive himself "as
238. Id. at 57.
239. Id. at 61.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 62.
243. Id. at 68. The legal persona requires the reigning in of feelings. Seymour
Wishman, exploring his work as a criminal lawyer, observes: "If a crime or a criminal had
been particularly offensive, I had always coped with my feelings by putting them aside, out
of the way of my professional judgments. My method of dealing with these kinds of cases
had seemed emotionally necessary and ethically appropriate." WISHMAN, supra note 41,
at 42. Wishman finds that what initially is viewed as an emotional necessity takes its toll
when the need to "function dispassionately" separates his "emotional and intellectual
reactions." Id. at 239. Wishman concludes:
[emotional] detachment had been of an even colder sort because I had been
conjuring up false emotions in an effort to influence the jury. I was suddenly,
overwhelmingly aware of just how much these contrived emotions had been
deceitful performances-calculated lies. Too many of the performances had
been successful, and, as a result, I had become suspicious of my own emotions
in other contexts. And certainly I had been suspicious of the emotions
expressed by others ....
Id. at 240.
244. CAMUS, supra note 26, at 66. One wonders whether Clamence's relations with
women is not an analogue of his relation with clients, perhaps an analogue of the relation
that many lawyers have with clients.
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to the truth" of his character.2 4' He laughs at the foolishness of
his speeches and pleadings in court. "Even more," he says, "at my
court pleading than at my speeches to women."
246
Clamence calls what has happened, and his feelings about
himself, shame, but only reluctantly and without commitment.
But whatever the feeling, he claims it has never left him since the
"adventure" on the bridge and the cries of the drowning woman
that lies "at the heart" of his memory.247
Where does Clamence's insight and self-discovery lead? We
want to think it leads somewhere, that it might result in a more
truthful life. If self-knowledge is a way of seeing ourselves more
truthfully, then we want to think that seeing ourselves truthfully
will be an impetus for a more responsible professional life. But
Clamence, like the alcoholic unready to give up drinking, has not
reached bottom; not yet.
To be sure, I knew my failings and regretted them. Yet
I continued to forget them with a rather meritorious
obstinacy. The prosecution of others, on the contrary,
went on constantly in my heart .... [D]oes that shock
you? Maybe you think it's not logical? But the question
is not to remain logical. The question is to slip through
and, above all-yes, above all, the question is to elude
judgment.... [I]t's a matter of dodging judgment, of
avoiding being forever judged without ever having a
245. Id.
246. Id. at 65.
247. Id. at 69. Earlier Clamence has noted that "the heart has its own memory." Id.
at 6. Clamence's monologue, lasting we are told some five days, is itself a work of memory,
creating a story that moves from the surface of how he has lived (with a set of assumptions
about his self-proclaimed virtuous life) to the darker shadow side of his character. The
story that Clamence tells is a work of remembered life:
First I had to recover my memory. By gradual degrees I saw more clearly, I
learned a little of what I knew. Until then I had always been aided by an
extraordinary ability to forget. I used to forget everything ....
I never remembered anything but myself.
Id. at 49-50. "But just think of your life, mon cher compatriote! Search your memory and
perhaps you will find some similar story that you'll tell me later on." Id. at 65. "[Alfter
prolonged research on myself, I brought out the fundamental duplicity ofthe human being.
Then I realized, as a result of delving in my memory, that modesty helped me to shine,
humility to conquer, and virtue to oppress." Id. at 84. Clamence speaks of practicing a
"useful profession" that "consists to begin with.., in indulging.., myself up and down.
It's not hard, for I now have acquired a memory." Id. at 139.
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sentence pronounced.248
Clamence has used success to avoid being judged. "[W]ealth
shields from immediate judgment, takes you out of the subway
crowd to enclose you in a chromium-plated automobile, isolates
you in huge protected lawns, Pullmans, first-class cabins. Wealth,
cher ami, is not quite acquittal, but reprieve, and that's always
worth taking."
249
In seeing himself more clearly, Clamence becomes distrustful
and vulnerable. 2" His social and public world begins to fall
apart. He becomes "aware only of the dissonances and disorder
that filled me; I felt vulnerable and open to public accusa-
tion."251 He discovers that he has enemies.252 The truth takes
its toll. "The day I was alerted I became lucid; I received all the
wounds at the same time and lost my strength all at once. The
whole universe then began to laugh at me."25" The conversion
to honesty does not make for instant healing.
There is not much need to wrestle with Clamence's story if we
assume we are morally innocent, or at worst, more moral than
others. As a teacher of legal ethics I find that those who set out
to be lawyers, regardless of their moral attentiveness, assume
that they are, basically, essentially, good, honest, and true, and
that in becoming a lawyer they will live a version of the good life.
But are we, like Clamence, deceiving ourselves? Clamence
argues:
[We don't want to improve ourselves or be bettered, for
we should first have to be judged in default. We merely
wish to be pitied and encouraged in the course we have
chosen. In short, we should like, at the same time, to
cease being guilty and yet not to make the effort of
cleansing ourselves. Not enough cynicism and not
enough virtue. We lack the energy of evil as well as the
248. Id. at 76-77.
249. Id. at 82.
250. Id. at 77-78. Alice Koller also warns of the dangers of self-reflection. See supra
note 179.
251. CAMUS, supra note 26, at 78.
252. Id. at 79.
253. Id. at 80.
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energy of good.'
Clamence, the consummate game player, admits the difficulty
of self-insight, and that even insight can become a game.
Clamence, on this point, joins Alice Koller who warned that
self-reflection can become an act, another role. "To be sure, I
occasionally pretended to take life seriously. But very soon the
frivolity of seriousness struck me and I merely went on playing
my role as well as I could. I played at being efficient, intelligent,
virtuous, civic-minded, shocked, indulgent, fellow-spirited,
edifying . .. ."2 We are, it seems from Clamence's narrative,
so strongly fortified against insight and so taken with
game-playing that we will, without caution, undermine efforts at
self-reflective honesty. One way Clamence defends himself
against insight is by immersing himself in his work. "I was still
living on my work although my reputation was seriously damaged
by my flights of language and the regular exercise of my profes-
sion compromised by the disorder of my life."2s Clamence finds
that his professional work is "compromised" by the disorder in his
life. 7  And the reverse is true as well; Clamence recognizes
that "real vocations are carried beyond the place of work."
211
Clamence, following the ebb and flow of his narcissism,
bottoms-out and falls into "the most utterly forlorn state."2"9
"For more than thirty years I had been in love exclusively with
myself."21 I had "a longing to be immortal."26 1 "I was," says
Clamence, "absent at the moment when I took up the most
space."262 The only way to proceed, Clamence concludes, is "to
break open the handsome wax-figure I presented to the
world."26
254. Id. at 83.
255. Id. at 87.
256. Id. at 106.
257. For a dramatic visual representation of the relationship of personal and private,
see the film, THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century Fox 1982); see also REED, supra note 1.
258. CAMUS, supra note 26, at 130-31.
259. Id. at 96.
260. Id. at 100.
261. Id. at 102.
262. Id. at 87.
263. Id. at 94.
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VI.
Jean-Baptiste Clamence engages in what he calls "public
confession. "2 Charles Reich, a highly acclaimed Yale law
professor and author of a best selling book, The Greening of
America, writes at length about his self-diagnosed neurosis and
repressed homosexuality. Alice Koller needs several hundred
pages to tell the detailed story of her failed and fragmented life.
Some readers are going to take objection to the idea that we
might have anything to learn from this practice of public confes-
sion. We should, the objectors contend, bear the anguish of our
pathologies in silence.
Confessional pathologizing, even if a distinctively human
necessity, is awkward. We are warned against it, against
whimpering and self-pity, of making private failures public; we
fear being seen as sick, weak, vulnerable, confused, conflicted,
impotent, inept, incompetent. We subscribe to the power of
positive thinking. Winners ignore doubts. We believe in the
virtue of having one self for the world to see (a comforting,
non-doubting persona) and another for use when the world is not
watching (a self that encompasses all that we are not willing to
have the world to see and know).
We are taught many things, even to tell the truth, but we are
not taught how to deal with the shadow (non-public, unpresented,
doubtful, dark) side of professional life. No one tells us how to
use and to learn how these thoughts that cut against the grain of
success are essential to any success worth having. Is it no
surprise then, that we do not know exactly what to make of the
confessions and pathologizing of Ilych, Reich, Koller, and
Clamence? What do they teach? We are taught to turn away
from pathologized views of the world. Belief in the power of
positive thinking presets us against attentiveness to the power of
bottom-up, pathologized thinking.
25
264. Id. at 139.
265. James Hillman uses the term pathologizing "to mean the psyche's autonomous
ability to create illness, morbidity, disorder, abnormality, and suffering in any aspect of its
behavior and to experience and imagine life through this deformed and afflicted
perspective." JAMES HILLMAN, A BLUE FIRE 143 (Thomas Moore ed., 1989).
We pathologize-look at the world and ourselves from the perspective of our
pathologies-so we can see, experience, and act on the contrast between surface and depth,
appearance and reality, worth and waste, success and failure, as they produce conflict and
energy in our lives.
To talk about our symptoms, our pains and suffering, our pathologies, is a way,
according to James Hillman, back to the soul, and a needed re-visioning of psychology.
Hillman makes pathologizing central to soul-centered psychology. "Fundamental to depth
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Why, then, confess to the kind of shadow life that figures so
prominently in the narratives and autobiographies explored in
this essay? Why should we bother to concern ourselves with the
failures outlined so vividly by Ilych and Clamence? It is, evident-
ly, uncomfortable to have the unsaid bearing down on us,
weighing on us, pulling at us.2 We confess to alleviate the
incongruity of what we know (the real, the true) and others do not
(appearance, facade). We confess to honor the gap, the distance,
the gulf, that lies between who we are and what we purport to be
(Clamence), who we are and what others would have us be (Reich
and Koller). Confession comes from an articulation of
self-acknowledged failure: I did not love enough; my love was too
modest; my need to win harmed others. I did not care enough; I
held myself out to be an altruist when I cared most about myself.
In becoming a judge of others, I learn, with Clamence, that I have
mistakenly assumed that I could remain free from judgment. We
confess because we are burdened with lives that deviate from the
straight and narrow of well-worn paths.
Confessions are never straightforward, as in the recital of
facts; they are no more truthful in this literal way than any other
description of human affairs. Confession takes us into a labyrinth
of rationalization, self-deception; a world of entangled stories,
psychology and to the soul is hurt, affliction, disorder, peculiarity...." JAMES HILLMAN,
On the Necessity of Abnormal Psychology: Ananke and Athene, in FACING THE GODS 1, 1
(1980). The symptom, starting point in Freudian psychoanalytical psychology, is for
Hillman, an opening into the labyrinth of the soul. Russell Lockhart, another follower of
C.G. Jung, points out:
From the perspective of analytical psychology, a symptom not only
expresses an underlying psychic process but also may represent a positive
attempt by the unconscious to force the individual into a process of conscious-
ness, the aim of which is a progressive realization of the Self.
RUSSELL A. LOCKHART, WORDS AS EGGS: PSYCHE IN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 9 (1983).
Lockhart goes on to suggest that ridding an individual of his symptoms "may be clothed
in humanitarianism, but it may also deprive him of an opportunity to learn the meaning
of his own life. It may, in fact, deprive him of the opportunity and will toward individua-
tion." Id. at 31
266. We speak our minds and say what we know about our lives to ease the pressure:
we want to get shadow matters "off our chest." We confess this shadow life to ease the
burden, to speak the unspeakable. The basic honesty we learn as children calls for
confession; humility demands it. Confession is integral to psychological therapy, some
religious practices, and to our present system of justice. (The conviction of criminal
defendants often relies upon confession of the defendant.). The severity of justly deserved
punishment, for the criminal and non-criminal alike, is thought to depend on confession.
While it's hard to find anyone, except practicing Catholics, young children, and naive first
criminal offenders, expected to confess on a regular basis, yet, we continue to confess.
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stories that conflict and confound; stories in which we ask for
forgiveness (from ourselves and others) and it is not forthcoming,
or it comes too late, or it comes but with reservations.
A confession leaves us breathless, fearful, confused, at a loss
for words, or numb to feeling. Confession turns what was solid
ground beneath us to quagmire. In a heart-rending moment of
confession, a new version of the truth is pronounced, and we learn
in the most frighteningly immediate and real way about truth, a
truth that relocates us in a different story, a different world than
the one we had imagined for ourselves in the moment prior to the
confession.267 A confession derails stories and is itself a kind of
story. In confession stories the lives we live are diagnosed and we
are asked to see a life from the bottom up. A confessional
narrative has the power to change the life we think we are
always, forever, going to be living. Alive and well, a plan and a
purpose, doing what we want, getting ahead; the confessional
stories explored in this essay suggest it could, at any time, be
otherwise."
We do not enter readily this world of self-diagnosed failure;
a world by nature bleak, unappealing, and dark. In this world of
failed dreams, false virtue, and success achieved at the highest of
moral and psychological cost we are all neighbors who treat each
other as strangers.
The stories presented here confront us with the harsh reality
of lives that have gone astray, with choices and fates that
267. Some confessions, small in nature, do not shake the world. I do not keep my
checkbook balanced; I have loved two women and did not have the courage to be honest
with either. The confession of a spouse, "I have been having an affair," works differently
than saying "I confess that I am bored with my work." We know the difference, in
confessing that we have AIDS and admitting that we do not spend enough time with our
aging parents.
268. We may all, sooner or later, get to a cross-roads, a life-stage, where we find we
have trouble getting on with what we are doing. Our imaginative energy for the work
dries up; or we see, anew, with new images, the way the work deforms the story we most
want to live. Something, in our work, our loving, our images, seems inadequate, or false,
and we are thrown into turmoil, crises. What we have taken to be virtue now reveals itself
to be vice, old ways of doing things now make us sick, feats of strength are now seen as
destructive. Ease becomes dis-ease. Reality catches up with and trumps appearance. Our
pathology has caught up with us. Our immunity to disorder is cancelled. We find
ourselves uneasy with life, with the work we do, with the person we have become.
Something has gone wrong.
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undermine dreams of success.269 We are placed (as readers and
as lawyers) in an awkward position. We can resist and turn our
back on these confessional narratives,270 question the narrator's
self-diagnosis, patronize their disappointment and suffering, go on
about our lives, or we can enter the fray and see how the mis-
shaping, corrosive forces found in these narratives are induced in
our own lives by the way we imagine our work and our lives as
lawyers.
Some of us will shy away from these "shadow" narratives and
the pathologized images they present. The reason is simple: "[t]he
conscious self, the daytime self, ordinarily has no interest in
exploring the dark; it is only when ego-consciousness feels itself
about to be engulfed that it acts."271  Lawyer stories of disaffec-
tion and pathology, like lawyer jokes and cartoons,272 confront
us with realities we would rather ignore.
If the stories of disaffection are real, in relation to the lives
lawyers live, they demand attention.273 What we may come to
269. Thomas Moore argues that one who cares for the soul is at ease with the
unexpected. THOMAS MOORE, CARE OF THE SOUL: A GUIDE FOR CULTIVATING DEPTH AND
SACREDNESS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 17 (1992). "If we are going to be curious about the soul,
we may need to explore its deviations, its perverse tendency to contradict expectations.
And as a corollary, we might be suspicious of normality." Id. at 18.
270. Professionals have access to a variety of practices that protect and shield them
from education by way of confessional narrative. The strong and powerful of politics,
business, and the professions have created a world in which the currency of truth is
constantly devalued, making it hard to imagine any social or pedagogical investment in a
study of how lives go astray. In our fast-track culture, those who confess to failure and
pathology are simply dysfunctional or self-destructive. The live-for-success fascination with
manipulative commercialized images warns us away from confessional narratives.
271. WILLIAM J. O'BRIEN, STORIES TO THE DARK: EXPLORATIONS IN RELIGIOUS
IMAGINATION 41 (1977). What we learn from a story, assuming that a story may help us
learn something about life, depends on how we read it, what we think we need to learn,
and what we are open to learn about what we assume we already know.
272. Consider how lawyers get defensive when the legal profession is criticized. We
laugh at lawyer jokes because it is threatening to see them as truthful, as reflections of
how we are seen by others.
273. Jean-Baptiste Clamence claims that his confessional narrative is not a narcissistic
indulgence but implicates the life of the reader:
[L]et me point out that I don't accuse myself crudely .... No, I navigate
skillfully, multiplying distinctions and digressions, too-in short, I adapt my
words to my listener and lead him to go me one better. I mingle what concerns
me and what concerns others. I choose the features we have in common, the
experiences we have endured together, the failings we share-good form, in
other words, the man of the hour as he is rife in me and in others. With all
that I construct a portrait which is the image of all and of no one. A mask, in
short, rather like those carnival masks which are both lifelike and stylized, so
that they make people say: "Why, surely I've met him!" When the portrait is
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finally admit is that "[t]he lives of those who failed are equally
real, equally lived-perhaps they were lived better, but at all
events it cannot be denied that they were there."74 To enter
the world of Ivan Ilych we must accept the reality of his fall into
anguish. We cannot appreciate Reich's Charlie persona and his
description of the Law Firm World until we see and feel what it
means to compartmentalize our lives. Koller's pathologies will be
alien to us until we see courage in her relentless effort to
"unearth" a self beneath her fragmented life. Jean-Baptiste
Clamence's story records the musings of a Parisian lawyer who
spends his waking hours in an Amsterdam bar until we accept the
possibility that assumptions about our own goodness can lead to
an elaborate facade and a cover story rooted in self-deception and
denial.
Yet, we as readers have ways to keep the protagonists of
stories, fictional and autobiographical, at arms length to avoid
readings that question our own life.275 We assume that in our
own lives we are captains of the ship and can avoid the tangled
messes in which the text-bound protagonists find themselves.276
finished, as it is this evening, I show it with great sorrow: "This, alas, is what
I am!' The prosecutor's charge is finished. But at the same time the portrait
I hold out to my contemporaries becomes a mirror.
CAMUS, supra note 26, at 139-40.
274. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW 16 (1990). Goodrich makes a strong claim
for the study of failure.
To trace the underside of a discipline-to ask what it cost-is to recuperate the
specific motive fears that underlie the form of life, the weaknesses that border
any science conceived as truth, the excluded lives, the solitary figures, the
ashes of those who were burnt in the name of law. It is not just that myth or
irrationality are the necessary boundaries, the limits, of a science, but also that
the underside, the failures, the other history of a discipline, provides a ground
for reinterpretation.
Id. at 17.
275. One way we distance ourselves from the reality of Ilych's and Clamence's "fall'
is to read them as "fiction." For a brief commentary on the use of the fictional/real
dichotomy to distance ourselves from the moral lessons of lawyer narratives, see James R.
Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40 J. LEG. EDUC. 47, 59-63 (1990). Yet,
Koller and Reich are, in a sense, as fictional as Ilych or Clamence. We read the
autobiographical accounts of their lives and doubts arise as to how much of their
self-diagnosis can be literally true. What literal truth is there in the self reporting on itlelf
We have strategies for distancing ourselves from reality just as we do from "fiction."
276. As readers we distance ourselves by placing ourselves outside the text-a reader
is always an outsider-so we can see the narrator's self-diagnosed pathology as a mistake
that could have been, with reasonable care, avoided. A reader can find in her own life,
careful, deliberate choices make a different, safe life (a life more immune to pathology than
was Ilych, Reich, Koller, or Clamence) possible.
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We assume we can avoid going astray. Like Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych,
we assume we know what we want, can follow the well-worn path,
take our promotions and yearly raises, adapt ourselves to family
and community, and move through life day-to-day without
reflection, regret, or sadness.277 Some contend that living this
way is a virtue. Their advice goes something like this: Live life
one day at a time.27 8 Living life one day at a time may be the
only way it can be done-if Necessity would have it so-and again
it may turn out to be one of these slogans that hides us from a
once healthy illusion devoured by self-deception.
Consider another kind of distancing, one that puts us at
arms-length from Alice Koller and her pathologies. Some readers
will find Koller's self-diagnostic autobiography too much to bear.
She suffers too much. She is self-absorbed in pain. Who, the
skeptical reader asks, can possibly benefit from the pains of
another person's life recounted so exhaustively? What are we
supposed to learn from a woman who has been unable to form
lasting commitments and has, by her own account, no
self-sustaining sense of purpose in life? How can any one of us,
profession-bound, achievement-oriented, with the conditions for
material success in place, contemplate a life from the perspective
of its pathologies? 27
9
One fear is that no one can be so hard on themselves and
continue to function. (Lawyers risk placing the ability to function
277. "Sadness is a rattlingly common experience .... " Leon Wieseltier, The Prince of
Bummers, NEW YORKER, July 26, 1993, at 40, 40 (A brief phenomenology of sadness, and
the place of sadness in the songs of Leonard Cohen, the "prince of bummers.")
278. The admonition to slow down may mean that we should think about getting off
the fast-track and living more simple lives, or it may mean that we are to immerse
ourselves in the reality of everyday life, a reality so compelling that we can avoid
self-reflection.
279. With my life working the way it does, and with the security it affords (juxtaposed
against the uncertain fate that so many experience in their day-to-day lives and that must
surely wait in the wings for me as well), I can read my life story as a counter-point to the
story of disaffection told by Alice Koller.
No one of us may paint our own life in the bleak terms that Alice Koller uses. I do not.
I have work that constantly reminds me of the need for what Robert Pirsig in Zen and the
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance calls Quality. See ROBERT PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF
MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES (1974). Teaching law students
demands as much excellence of craft and character as I can muster. Consequently, there
has never been a moment in my 17 years of teaching when I could say of teaching, as
Koller does of her work, that it is a "little busy-work job." See KOLLER, supra note 140, at
2. Teaching work has always, for me, loomed bigger than the life I find possible to make
of it. I do not share with Koller the sense that "I'm just using up a number of days." See
id. at 1. My days are full, alive, rich, demanding.
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ahead of their continued psychological well-being). Another
concern is that turning inward in the way Koller does only makes
matters worse. Koller's self-analysis appears, to the
action-oriented student of law, as dysfunctional.2"' A law
student, or young lawyer, unlike Koller, may not imagine herself
at "this outermost edge" of life. 1 Becoming a lawyer is, after
all, as Charles Reich observes, a way of becoming an insider, a
way to experience being "in" on the action. The problem for
Koller's lawyer readers, as in readers of Ivan Ilych's despair, is
that they may have little sense of connection to the outermost
edge of their lives. And how could they when legal work catches
us up in the illusion that we are at the center of things?
There are many ways to distance myself from Koller, and
when I do a quiet calm settles in, a sense of reassurance; I am not
living this story that Alice Koller tells. I am a man and Koller is
a woman. That might make a difference. (The difference it might
make may get lost in the psychological politics of our present
thinking about gender differences.) I may see Koller as telling a
disempowering victim's story.282 Or, perhaps things aren't as
bleak as Koller would have us believe. It is tempting to talk back
to Koller, to say to her, things will get better. They do for me;
they will for you. Perhaps the story she tells distorts the relation
of bad and good times in her life. One way to distance ourselves
from pain and suffering is to question the reliability of the
narrator.
If I am not in the mess that Koller is in, I can keep Koller's
story at arm's length. My own life, at least by one accounting of
it, seems too simple and straightforward, normal and secure, for
any identification with Koller's narrative of disaffection. Whatev-
er mess I find myself in or imagine for myself, my own troubles
pale by comparison with Koller's.
The stories of disaffection and pathology turn a settled world
of achievement and success on its head. They suggest, as they
unsettle us, an element of life we busily avoid and deny. They
implicate the tendency of lawyers to use self-deception and denial
280. It is not only Alice Koller's story that legal readers will find problematic, but any
story that calls into question the ego trips we take as lawyers.
281. KOLLER, supra note 140, at 17.
282. My own reading of Koller's pathology is that she does not seek relief by blame or
stepping away from her own responsibility. Consequently, I do not see Koller as a victim
or as telling a victim's story.
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to get what we think we want (and what we assume our profes-
sion demands). It is difficult to accept the possibility that we are
engaged in self-deception and self-destruction. We see those
around us doing it. And we can, in brief glimpses, see that we
ourselves do it. So what is one to do? You can deny it. You can
rationalize it. And you can try to understand how it works.2"
The path to success, paved with good intentions and social
encouragement, is no guarantee that we will not go astray. If, as
Francis Allen argues, "victories are not inevitable" and "effort and
rectitude" are not enough, then "there is no certainty that the
forces of light will prevail over the forces of darkness."' One
might speculate that there are pedagogical and professional
consequences in the knowledge that
one may devote a lifetime to a purpose or a cause, make
sacrifices of health-and pleasure, and still be denied the
satisfaction of seeing one's goals achieved. But there is
perhaps an even more insidious realization. One may
pay dearly to achieve one's purpose and succeed, only to
discover that one's small triumph is too insignificant to
matter; or, even worse, to conclude that one was mistak-
en in his choice of goals, recognizing that one's achieve-
ment has done harm rather than good.285
Professional life, with all its satisfaction, exhilaration, and
wonder carries an underestimated, unexamined, dark side.
Stories of lawyer pathology suggest a need to be more attentive to
the dark, shadow side of professional life, to the pain, agony,
suffering, and tragedy that we live in and live out, and to which
lawyers, by the nature of their work, cannot be strangers. The
knowledge that others have gone astray, or that the success
283. The gap between the way I live and the story I tell is both a measure of
self-deception and a reflection of the hope that I have for myself. There is some possibility
that I can use my story (if I am able and willing to articulate it) to help me see the
tendency to engage in self-deception and how self-deception undermines what I want my
story to mean. One of the ways we disguise our lives is in glorifying them, taking up and
living illusions that we have created for ourselves (or had created for us). We tell stories
that embody phantasies of glory and use them as a subterfuge to avoid the truth. While
some of our illusions are healthy, sustaining ideals that receive harsh treatment in the
world, others are the makings of neurotic stances and pathologies in the making.
284. FRANcIs ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 156 (1979).
285. Id at 15-16.
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achieved by Robert Service or Ivan Ilych comes at high cost, will
not be a final deterrent to folly's in the life we have set out to live.
But the failure to heed the warnings implicit in these and other
cautionary tales should not deter us from remembering and
taking whatever precautions we can.
If you take the stories of Ilych, Reich, Koller, and Clamence
seriously, they offer a look around the corner of professional life
by demanding that we pause and ask: How does this way of life
I have chosen as a lawyer lead to trouble? Do lawyers not
attempt, in the name of professional virtue, to distance them-
selves from the painful realization that law has its own dark
shadow and that this shadow is cast over and into the life of those
who practice law? What are we to do with our pathologies, the
small ones of everyday life, and the large ones that threaten to
engulf us? Can our pathologies be viewed through any lens other
than that of dread? Can they be re-visioned as potentially
transformative rather than as troubles to be eradicated?
286
To understand how the culture of legal work with its gloss of
idealization can lead us astray, into moral confusion, arrogance of
certainty, and willed effort to deny the harm we do ourselves, we
may find stories of disaffection helpful. Stories of disaffection can
be instructive as evocative works of literature, as moral caution-
ary tales, and as psychological explorations that can be "put to
work" in our own lives.287 Pathologizing combats the inflation
(as costly in personal life as in the economy) of false optimism and
illusion and grounds us in the humility of convoluted
self-deceptions and the inability to achieve perfection. It makes
our lives real, as it makes them truthful. It highlights hope by
calling success and deluded optimism into question. Stories, in
286. The case of pathology re-visioned as a life's work that has most influenced me is
that of C.G. Jung, recounted in his autobiography, CARL G. JUNG, MEMORIES, DREAMS,
REFLECTIONS (Richard & Clara Winston trans., Aniela Jaffe ed., Vintage Books 1989)
(1961).
287. James Boyd White suggests we adopt an approach to reading, "a way of reading,"
that connects reading to living. JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 5
(1984). There is, says White, "a way of engaging the mind with a text, and learning from
it, that will affect the way one lives both with other texts, including those of one's own
composition, and with other people." Id. The confessional stories of self-diagnosed
pathology work on the reader and are "put to work" because "the relationship between
reader and writer is a kind of negotiation in which the reader constantly asks himself what
this text is asking him to assent to and to become and whether or not he wishes to
acquiesce." Id. at 16. A story can, argues White, teach us "how it should be 'read'" and
"how it should be understood and lived with, and this in turn teaches us much about what
kind of life we can and ought to have, who we can and ought to be." Id. at ix-x.
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particular stories of disaffection, may push us toward reflection
we would not otherwise do; they push us to consider new configu-
rations of meaning that make our lives more attentive to vulnera-
bilities, disabilities, and darkness.
We may find, in the pathologized and pathologizing charac-
ters of lawyer stories, something of value buried where we least
expect to find it. We may find that honest, truthful accounts of
how life fails will help us respond to the question that Socrates,
the patron saint of legal education, made the first question of
philosophy: How is one (who happens to be a lawyer) to live a
good life?
